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SERRANO V. PRIEST
School Finance Inequities
and Potential Remedies
(February, 1973)
Laird P. Warner, B.A. Michigan State University
M.A. Michigan State University
Directed by: Dr. Rhody A. McCoy
:

School finance experts have known for a long
time that the large disparities in spending for education

between school districts was primarily caused by the great

variation in taxable wealth between the districts.
Attempts to equalize spending differentials between school

districts through the legislative process (state aid)
have historically failed because of the local self-

interest of politicians who are interested in protecting
tax advantages for their wealthy districts.

Those seeking

changes in the present school finance system have been

forced to use other avenues to fight the inequities in
The battle was moved to

state school finance systems.
the courts.

In Serrano v. Priest

,

the Supreme Court of the

State of California declared that California's school

funding scheme was unconstitutional because it violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The court observed that the school funding system
it
"invidiously discriminated against the poor because

function of
makes the quality of a child's education a
the wealth of his parents and neighbors."
vi

Serr a no has

ee.rved as a model for six other court decisions,

and there

are presently at least forty-five similar suits In varying

stages of litigation.

Taking the school finance crisis as a given and
the uncertainty of most state school financing systems, it
is crucial to examine and evaluate the possible legislative

remedies that flow from this "wealth neutrality principle."
The various school finance plans fall into four

general categories:
(2)

(1)

Pull State Funding Plans;

State and Local Support Plans; (3) Federal Support

Plans; (4) Cross Alternative Plans.

The various school

financing plans that are scrutinized cover the range of
real possible developments in school finance plans

—

three

flat grant models; a power-equalized plan; a federal foun-

dation plan; a district consolidation plan and a voucher
plan.

The alternative plans are evaluated on the basis

of four criteria:

teria;

(3)

(1)

legal criteria; (2) financial cri-

political criteria;

(4)

educational criteria.

After evaluating the various alternative plans, the author

concluded that a full-state assumption of educational costs
was the best solution to the present inequities in school

finance.

The author also concluded that before change

will occur in present methods of state school finance, a

court order will be needed.

What will happen if the U.S. Supreme Court
vii

supplies the tool for future court orders by allowing
the

wealth neutrality principle" to become a precedent?

One thing Is clear.

Most states will have to change their

present method of financing schools.

It is also clear

that money will be redistribued to poor districts, whose

spending will increase relative to the wealthy districts.
It is unclear whether this will benefit poor and minority

children.

Whether or not the

S

errano principle is victor-

ious in the Supreme Court, educators cannot assume that the

courts or state legislatures are going to deal with the
real issue -- equity in treatment of children.

Equity in

the distribution of school revenue is an essential first

step toward the attainment of improved educational quality
for poor and minority students, but it is only a beginning.

viii

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The Nature and Background
oT the Problem

School finance experts have known for a long
time that there were large intrastate disparities in
local wealth, school tax rates, and in levels of
spending.^-

The wide variations in school district

expenditure levels have been primarily attributable to
the heavy reliance on the local property tax for the

support of public education.

There have been a number of attempts to reduce
the effects of the wealth differentials through the

use of state aid plans.

The foundation plan (used in

over half of the states) and the percentage equalizing

plan are the two most common approaches used to help

equalize the wealth disparities.

If these plans were

applied in their theoretical forms, both would eliminate
the effects of the local wealth differentials.

Unfortunately, the actual impact of the state
aid plans has been far different than their Intent.

^Stephen Weiss, Existing Disparities in Public
School Finance and Proposals for Reform (Boston:
p^ ToV
Federal Reserve Bank, 1970)
,

,

1

3

2

The ineffectiveness of state aid in substantially equa-

lizing the impact of the local wealth differentials has
been caused by a number of factors.

The foundation and

percentage equalizing plans have been modified from
their prefer red theoretical forms In a number of ways

which nullify their intended effect.

The intended

equalization effect of a foundation plan can be impeded
by setting the foundation level at a very low level.

Foundation plans are often combined with other types of
state aid that neutralize the equalizing impact.

A flat

grant, which is often tied to a foundation plan, has an

anti-equalizing effect. 2

Equalization of

a

percentage

equalizing plan can be effectively nullified by:
(1)

guaranteeing minimum state aid ratios for all dis-

tricts no matter what the district's wealth, (2) placing
a ceiling on state aid which prevents full equalization

to take place,

(3)

state will fund,

placing a dollar maximum that the

(A-)

limiting the types of spending the

state will support, (5) inadequate state funding, and
(6)

refusal to require negative payments from wealthy

districts

.

John E. Coons, William H. Clune III and
Stephen D. Sugarman, Private Wealth and pub lic Education,
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1970), pp. 106-108.
2 See

3weiss, Existing Disparities

,

pp.

35-36.

:

3

State aid plans and distribution formulas appear
to be more the result of political compromise than

rational educational policy.

Politicians who are com-

pelled to be custodians of a parltlcular constituency

instead of being Individuals who are concerned about

inequities in school spending, have been unwilling to
vote against their political interests.

Truly equalizing

state finance systems have not been legislated.

Those

seeking changes in the present school finance systems
have been forced to look elsewhere for solutions to
the inequities in school finance.

The battle for school

financing reform was then moved to the courts.
The legal underpinnings for a constitutional

attack on the inequities in school district spending

were laid by both educators and lawyers in the mid 1960's.

Arthur Wise's thesis in educational administration at
the University of Chicago, which was later developed
into the book Rich Schools. Poor Schools:
of Equal Educational Opportunity

,

The Promise

was the first to

develop the initial argument for a legal attack on a
state's school financing system.

He argued that a state

school financing system must satisfy the "educational
needs" of the children or it was unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.^

^Arthur E. Wise, Rich Schools, Poor Schools
The Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity (Chicago
University of Chicago Press, 196?), p. 133.
:

,

4

Using Wise's approach as a basis for complaints, suits
were filed in a number of states, but two quick; negative

decisions in the federal district courts of Illinois and
West Virginia^ suggested that the legal approach needed

modification.
Lawyers Jack Coons, William Clune and Stephen
Sugarman, in their book private Wealth and Public

Education

,

modified the argument so that it focussed

on disparities in spending per student.

Their theory

provided the basis for the first successful constitutional challenge of a state's school financing system
in California.

The decision of the Californis State

Supreme Court in Serrano

v.

Priest declared California's

school funding scheme unconstitutional because it

violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution.
S

Since the

errano decision was reached on August 31, 1971, there

have been four decisions affirming the

S

errano principle

and one decision denying it.^
^ Mclnnls v. Shapiro 293 F. Supp. 327 (1968)
and Buruss v. Wllkerson 310 F. Supp. 572 (1969).

^The decisions similar to S errano were:
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield (Minnesota) 40 uTs.L.W. 2228
Rodriguez v. San Antonio (Texas) 40 Law Week
19tl)
2398 (1972)7 Robinson v. Cahill*^ New Jersey) Superior
Court of New Jersey-Hudson County Docket No. L-18704-69
(1972); and Hollins v. Shofstall (Arizona) Superior
Court of Arizona - Maricopa County No. C-253652 (1972).
In a similar suit, the New York Supreme Court (a trial
court) rejected the plaintiff's claims in Spano v.
(

;

5

The California Supreme Court observed that the
school financing system in California "invidiously

discriminated against the poor because it makes the
quality of a child's education a function of the wealth
of his parents and neighbors.

The Court stated that

the wide disparities in spending among the school dist-

ricts in Los Angeles County were Inevitable because of
the large differentials in taxable wealth.

State aid

has closed some of the spending differential, but it
has been insufficient to bring about any significant

equalization.

In declaring the use of local property

tax unconstitutional for the support of education, the

Court stated that education was a "fundamental interest,"
and this fundamental right could not be conditioned on

wealth.

At least thirty suits challenging state school

financing systems in various states have used the
decision as a model for the complaint.

S

errano

States that have

not had suits filed are vulnerable to such suits, with

the exception of Hawaii.

Hawaii has assumed full respon-

sibility for funding its public schools.

Lakeland Central School District (New York) Supreme
Court of Westchester County, Index No. 1056 (1972).
The Van Dusartz and Rodriguez decisions came in federal
district courts while all the other suits were decided
in state courts.
errano v. Priest California Court Reporter,
5 Cal. 3d 5S4, (l$7i), p.“b^3.
,

)

6

The Serrano decision is not final, however.
It has been remanded to the Los Angeles Superior Court

for trial on the facts.

The other decisions which were

similar to the Serrano decision are not final, either.

One of the cases, Rodriguez

v.

San Antonio

,

has been

appealed to the United States Supreme Court by the
Texas Education Agency.

On June 7, 1972, the Supreme

Court accepted the case, but a decision will not be
reached for some time.

The Rodriguez case will be

placed on the October 1972 docket, and a decision will
be reached later during the session.®

Only then will

an accurate picture of the meaning of the

decision emerge

— win

S

errano

or lose in the Supreme Court.

Even with the tentativeness of the decisions,
S

errano and its progeny are being compared with the

Brown

v.

the Board of Education decision concerning

their probable Importance for education.

The Serrano

decision has been called "the most important event in
school finance in this century. ”9
S

errano and its progeny are acting as catalysts

which are causing widespread reexamination of present

^Stephen Browning, memorandum from the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Feb. 15, 1972.
(See Appendix C.
Thomas James, "The Conditions for Educational
State Aid Models to Achieve Equality," a paper
Equality:
prepared for the Schoolmen's Day program, Dec. 2, 1971,
9r.

p.

2.

—

u

7

educational finance methods*

The legal focus on school

finance Is a timely one because schools are presently

facing an ever-growing fiscal crisis.

Growth in expenditures, for example, haB outrun
the growth in the economy as a whole over the
last decade.
Education has averaged a 9.7 per
cent growth in expenditures while the Gross
National product was averaging a 6.8 per cent
annual increase. 1 0
-

Spending per pupil in public elementary and secondary
schools has increased sevenfold from 193° to 1968
(#130 per pupil to #750 per pupil). 11

Although school

enrollments have started to level off, other factors,
such as rising teacher salaries, the ever-rising cost
of living, and demand for improved educational methods

and materials, will tend to push school costs higher
in the future.
To raise the money to cover the increasing

expenditures caused by higher teacher salaries and
increased capital costs, it has been necessary to

continually increase taxes.

Taxpayers no longer

willingly approve increased tax levies and new bond
l0 Joel Berke, "The Current Crisis in School
Inadequacy and Inequality," Phi Del ta Kappan,
Finance:
Sept. 1971, p. 2.

L1 Henry Levin, "The Effect of Different Levels
National Ed c_ a of Expenditure on Educational Output,"
tlonal Finance Project, II, 173.

8

issues as they once did.

In 1969-70, local taxpayers

dipped into their pockets for over twenty billion of the

thirty-nine billion dollars that was spent on
elementary and secondary education. 12
The local property tax is the one tax that the
voter (taxpayer) has a direct say in, and he is saying
"no" to over half of the new budgets being proposed.

In 1970-71, California voters rejected over sixty per
cent of the proposed tax increases and bond Issues.
In Michigan, twenty of twenty-five requests for the

existing tax rate were defeated, while New York State
had 119 school budget increases defeated by voters.

New Jersey suffered the largest number of budget rejections in its history. 13

As a result of the defeats

of tax rate increases, there have been numerous staff

reductions, which have caused higher pupil-teacher
ratios.

Numerous experimental programs have been
Spending for

dropped because of the lack of funds.

guidance, psychblogical, and library services has been
cut.

The revenue shortage is only one side of the

problem.

The inequitable methods used to raise the
l^ Digest of Educational Statistics

13Berke, "Current Crisis,"

p.

3.

,

1970, p. 51.

9

revenue (the local property tax) Is the other side of
the school finance crisis.

The local property tax

carries the major burden for supporting local govern-

mental services, of which education is one.

Revenue

collected from local property levies accounts for

ninety-eight per cent of the money raised by local
school districts.

The local districts provided over

half of the money for public elementary and secondary

education in 1970-71 (fifty-two per cent). 14

The heavy

reliance on property tax revenues has serious consequences
for school district spending and tax rates.

The uneven

distribution of real property in districts causes wide
variations in levels of expenditures per pupil.

The

real-estate poor districts have to tax themselves at
much higher rates in their attempt to achieve spending
l

parity with wealthier districts.

Most are unsuccessful,

as is noted in Serrano v. Priest. 1 ^

State aid does not

l4 "Puture Dimensions in Educational Finance,"
Finance Project 1971, p. 9.
Educational
National
,

^Baldwin Park's assessed valuation per child
is #3,706 per pupil, while Beverly Hills was #50,805
per pupil -- a ratio of 1 to 13. Baldwin Park residents
paid a school tax rate of #5.48 per #100 of assessed
valuation, while Beverly Hills' residents paid only
The
a ratio of more than 2 to 1.
#2.30 per #100
provided
aid
higher tax. rate in Baldwin Park with state
#577.49 per pupil, while the lower tax rate and state
aid in Beverly Hills provided #1231.72 per pupil in
This data is taken from Serrano v. Priest
1968-69.
p. 608.

—

,

.

10

come close to equalizing the district spending
differentials.

In addition, the property tax Is very regressive

(It falls the hardest on the poor), because families

In the lowest Income bracket spend a higher portion of

their income for housing than do higher income people.

Families in the lowest income bracket pay about
thirty per cent more in property taxes in relation to their income than families in the highest
brackets
The property tax has often been arbitrarily administered,

which adds to the inequities.

The regressiveness and

the arbitrary administration of the property tax add

another dimension to the school finance crisis.
Taking the financial crisis of schools as

a

given and the uncertainty of the constitutionality of
most state school financing schemes which rely heavily
on the local property tax, it is crucial at this time
to try to examine the S errano decision and its progeny

for possible consequences in school finance.

This will

require clarification, as concretely as possible, as to
what the courts meant in the school finance decisions.

Then it will be necessary to try to answer some critical
questions relating these decisions to school finance.

What are the remedies called for in the decisions?

^Jesse Burkhead, Public School Finance
(New York:

,

Syracuse University Press, 1964), pp. 183-84.

11

Where will the remedies be developed?

What impact

are these decision likely to have on education?

The courts have provided an important stimulus
and the impetus for the various state legislatures to

reexamine the present methods of financing public
schools.

A number of alternative remedies are emerging

as potential legislative options.

Pull-state assumption

of the responsibilities for financing schools is

attracting the most interest at the present time.
Hawaii and the Province of New Brunswick in Canada are

already using this method for financing their schools.
Hawaii spends $984 per pupil in its one state-wide
school district that has
tary students. 17

185,000 secondary and elemen-

The Fleischman Commission, a school

finance commission in New York,l® has recommended a

modified full-state funding plan with

a

state-wide

property tax.

President Nixon has suggested that the local

property tax be eliminated and that money for local
schools come from a national value-added tax
of a national sales tax).

(

a form

Estimates by H.E.W. project

17" Hawaii Avoids Disparities," New York Times
January 10, 1972, p. 26 e.

l^ Report of the New York State Commission on
tary_and
the Quality. Cost and Financing of Elem_e_n
Secondary Education 1972.
,

,

12

that the value-added tax, at 2 per cent, could
\
raise

$16 billion, which would be about 40 per cent of the
$39 billion spent on public elementary and secondary

education in 1969-70. ^-9

The federal government would

redistribute the money to the states in the form of
block grants or to the local school districts on a per
pupil basis.
A third potential solution for remedying the

inequalities in school spending would be to redraw district lines so as to equalize, as nearly as possible, the

taxable wealth in each district.

This could be accom-

plished by consolidating small high-cost districts,

regionalizing other activities, and by metropolitanlzing
other districts.
A fourth alternative has been proposed by

John Coons, William Clune and Stephen Sugarman in their
book Private Wealth and Public Education .

Their proposal,

district power-equalizing, is based on the principle
that all districts should have equal power to raise

revenue at the same tax rate.

For every tax rate, there

would be a corresponding per pupil expenditure level
that all districts would receive.

Under the district

power-equalizing plan, a district would choose the level

Times

,

19 n Guess Who Finally Pays the Tax," New York
Feb. 6, 1972, p. 3 £.

13

at which it wished to spend by selecting a
given tax

rate.

If a district chose a specific tax rate and it

did not raise the designated amount of money,
then the

state would have the responsibility of malting up the

difference.

Conversely, if a district received more

revenue than the designated amount at a specific tax
rate, the district would have to surrender all the money

collected over the designated amount for redistribution
by the state.

Other potential remedies, such as the voucher
system, the National Educational Trust (proposed by

Governor Shapp of Pennsylvania) and the modification
of present finance systems, will also be examined in

the study.

The alternative school finance plans described
in the study need to be evaluated before their potential

importance for education can be predicted.

The criteria

which will be used to evaluate the alternative plans
for school finance fall into four general categories:
(1)

the legal criteria;

tical criteria;

(4)

(2)

financial criteria;

educational criteria.

(3)

poli-

The criteria

were designed to cover the critical issues that must be

dealt with in the construction of a new school finance
system.

The legal and financial criteria were designed

to reflect the inequities identified in the court deci-

sions on school finance.

The political criteria were

14

structured so that they would provide a framework to

analyze the political acceptability of the alternative
school finance plans.

The educational criteria

d

eal

with the crucial question relating the quality of education
to school finance.

The first criterion is that the different plans
must satisfy the fiscal neutrality principle established
in the 5 errano decision and reaffirmed in decisions in

Minnesota, Texas, New Jersey and Arizona.

This means

that variations in the ability of local school districts
to support education must be eliminated altogether or

must be greatly reduced by the states.

The establishment

of wealth neutrality as a principle for state school

finance has not been settled finally as a legal issue,
but it has generally been accepted as the minimum require-

ment of acceptability for any new state school system.
A second criterion that emerges with the

first is that state school funding schemes should equalize
the tax burden among the school districts and should

equalize their revenue-raising capabilities for the same
tax effort.

Although the Serrano decision and its progeny

did not speak directly to the question of equalization of

the tax burden, it is considered a highly desirable

objective by educators, economists and lawyers alike.

.

15

Ihe third criterion to be used in the evaluation
of the alternative models Is the political
acceptability
of the different proposals.

There are two significant

aspects tied to this criterion.

The first is the issue

of local control of public schools.

The local sur tax

option will be a crucial aspect of this debate.

The

second aspect of the political acceptability criterion

relates to the question over the cost of the finance
plan.

If any significant equalization of educational

spending is to take place, it will come at the expense
of the wealthy suburban districts who will have to pay

the bill in increased taxes.

The suburbs generally

have the political clout to make or break any school

finance model suggested in the legislature.

unlikely that any state will initiate

It is very

a new school finan-

cing program that calls for a significant increase in
the total cost of education for the states.

The poli-

tical acceptability of the models will be the crucial

factor in the type of legislation that emerges to remedy
the present inequities in the existing school financing

systems
The final criterion is that equal educational

opportunity should be facilitated by the models.

The

term "equal educational opportunity," for the purposes
of this study, means that the variations in educational

16

needs of the students should be met through
the allocation of funds on the basis of student weighting.

The

funds should be distributed so as to provide low
expen-

diture (low taxable wealth districts) with the means to

improve the quality of their educational offering.

This

criterion is the hardest to satisfy, but it should be
a central focus of any new school finance legislation. 20

Although the political acceptability of the
different models will be the prime consideration in
the selection of a new school financing scheme, the

impact of the models on the public schools is very impor-

tant because of the educational crises facing the country.
The educational crises are more serious than the financial problems facing education.

They have been well-

documented by numerous scholars and writers, notably
Charles Silberman, Kenneth Clark, Paul Goodman, Jonathan
Kozol, John Holt, Ivan Illich, and the list could go on

almost endlessly.

Education damages many children by

schooling them to think that teaching is learning, that
grade advancement is education, and that a diploma

20por further information on criteria for
evaluating state school financing models, see "Evaluating
Finance
State School Finance Plan," National Educational
T
article
s
Sllard
and
Jokn
project, Vol. V, pp. 231-263,
'^Legislative Options for Achieving public Education
Equalization," an unpublished paper presented to Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1971.

.
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represents competence. 21

Many children are taught

be failures In school. 22

close to forty per cent of

to

the students who enter high school drop out before they

finish, and of the dropouts who return to school,

seventy-five per cent leave again. 23

Those students who

remain In school Instead of dropping out are provided

drastically different facilities and learning experiences.
This has been documented by the Coleman Report.

Academic

achievement varies widely within our society and minority
groups

"

scored substantially below white students" 2 ^

on all the tests administered.

crisis is more acute.

In urban areas, the

Urban schools are helping to

cause academic retardation in all too many students.
Test results in reading demonstrate this vividly in

New York City. 2 ^

"One of the most striking phenomena

21 Ivan Illich, Deschoollng Society
Harper & Row, 1970)
p. 1.

,

(New York:

,

22 See John Holt, How Children Fall
(New York:
"( Sobools~l?lthout
er,
Glass
William
Dell, 1964), and
Failure , (New York: Harper & Row, 1969)
,

23 H olt, How Children Fall p. 15, and Paul
Goodman, Compul sory Mls-educatlon , (New York: Vintage,
1964) , p. l5.
,

—

Equal Educational
Coleman Report
aT
Appendix
See
1966, p. 20.

2 4<jhe

Opportunity ,

25"scribner Asks for Improved Instruction in
Reading," New York Times Feb. 20, 1972, p. 55.
See Appendix B for datai
,

18

in the Public Evaluation Program score data is that

over time, more and more children are falling below the

minimum competence in both reading and mathematics. "26
The urban schools are creating a pattern of rejection,
despair, hopelessness, and generally a massive wastage
of large numbers of human beings.

The situation is not much more encouraging in
other schools either.

In a survey taken in New York in

1971, "more than 66 per cent of the students sampled

indicated that they did not enjoy school," while many
students indicated that their school experience was
painful. 28

Studehts are dropping out physically and

Increasing numbers are turning to drugs as

mentally.

an escape from the boring routine of school while others

are actively fighting schools' regimentation through

demonstrations and protests.

As one student quipped:

"You have to have grown up in Scarsdale to know how
2
bad things really are." ^

26 "Home Life Linked to School Success," New
York Times , Jan. 30, 1972, p. 14.

27Kenneth Clark, "Alternative public School
Review Vol. 38, No. 1,
Systems," Harvard Education
—
Winter 196b, p. Iol.
,

28 Renort of the New York State Commission on the
Quality, CosT and Financing of Elementary and Secondary

Education

,

p.

1. 58.

29charles Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom
(New York: Random House, 1970), p. 2o.

,
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The crisis in schools today is both financial
and educational.

Will the recent court decisions provide

a vehicle for reforming school finance?
do,

If the reforms

in fact, take place, what will be their effect on

the low expenditure districts?

Assuming that the poor

districts get more money to spend, will this raise the

educational quality in those schools?

The importance of

this last question cannot be overstated.
The Purposes of the Study
The purposes of the study are:

(1)

to ascertain

the meaning of the recent court decisions concerning

inequalities in school district wealth, tax rates and
levels of spending; (2) to explore the potential signi-

ficance of these decisions for school finance; (3) to

identify alternative models that can be used as remedies
for the inequalities in state school financing systems;
(4)

to evaluate the alternative models for school finance.

Definition of Terms

Foundation Plan

.

—

This plan is a guarantee of some mini-

mum level of state support for all school districts, with
the intention of compensating for disparities in local

ability to support schools.

Percentage .Equalizing Grants

.

-- This approach involves the

.
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use of formula, such as:

otate Aid Ratio -

= (1- wealth ratio for district 1)

which determines the amount of school revenue that will
be allocated to the local districts by the states.

The

state aid ratio varies inversely with the relative local

wealth.

Equalized Valuation Per Pupil

.

—

This is used as the

measure of local ability to pay for schools.

It is

calculated by dividing the number of pupils into the
total assessed valuation.

This number reflects the

ability of local districts to pay for schools.

Equalized Valuation .

-- This is the value of the real

property expressed on an

"

equalized" basis (some fixed

ratio of full market value)

Full-State Funding

.

—

This is the state assumption of

the responsibility for financing local schools.

District Power-Equalizing

.

-- All districts choosing

the same tax rate would spend at the same level.

A

minimum and maximum spending level would be established
by the state.

If a district did not raise enough money

locally at the stipulated tax rate, then the state
3°Weiss, Existing Disparities

,

p.

34.
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would make up the difference.

If a district raised

more than the designated level of spending at the
specified tax rate, it Would have to surrender the amount
of

money to the state that was raised over the designated
amount.

The state would use these funds for redistri-

buting money to poor districts.

Sur

T ax

Add On . -- This is a local property tax that

the state would allow each district to levy to raise

revenue above the amount the state supplied.
Equal Protection Clause . -- This is the clause in the

Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which
states that equal protection and security shall be
given to all under like circumstances in his life, his
liberty, his property and in the pursuit of happiness
and in the exemption from any greater burdens and

charges than are equally imposed upon all in like

circumstances.

Fourteenth Amendment . -- The Fourteenth Amendment protects
citizens in that
any law

.

.

.

"

.

.

.no state

shall make or enforce

which shall abridge privileges or immuni-

ties of the United States; nor shall any state deprive

any person of life, liberty or property without due
SlBl aok s Law Dictionary 3rd Ed., (St. Paul,
Minnesota; West Publishing Co., 1968), p. 631.
1

,

.
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process of law; nor deny to any person within Its

Jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "32
The Limitations of the Study

The ambiguity and tentativeness of the recent

court decisions is a limiting factor In the study.

The

United States Supreme Court is now faced with the res-

ponsibility of malting the final decision on the constitutionality of the local property tax as a support for
public schools.

Even with the ambiguity of the Serrano

decision and its progeny, their influence is already
being felt in many legislatures throughout the country.

The concept of fiscal neutrality is becoming widely

accepted as a standard for school financing systems as

many legislatures begin to reexamine their school funding
systems
The great diversity in school finance systems
in the various states poses another limitation, but all

states except Hawaii rely heavily on the local property
tax to support schools.

Most of the states use either

a foundation plan or a percentage equalizing plan for

distributing state aid.

Each state will be affected

differently by the alternative models because of variations in population, regional differences, and economic

variations.
32u,s,

f

Constitution, Amendment XIV.
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The focus of this study will be on Intrastate

spending disparities that have been the focus of the
recent school finance decisions starting with Serrano

Priest .

v,

Interstate and lntradlstrlct spending disparities

are not examined specifically In the study, and this Is
a limitation of the study.

The lack of an acceptable definition of equality
of educational opportunity Is another limiting factor.

Educators have been unable to agree on an operational

definition of equal educational opportunity.
are widely held.

Two views

The traditional view of equal educa-

tional opportunity is essentially related to equal
access to schooling.

The minimum requirement for this

to exist is that approximately equal facilities,

cula, staff and expenditures must be present.

curri-

Given

equal access to schools and equal Inputs in those schools,
it becomes the individual'

s

responsibility to determine

the quantity and quality of educational benefits he or
she will derive from that system.
A more contemporary view relates equal oppor-

tunity more closely with equality of achievement.

According to this view, resources are to be used as
tools for reaching specific goals that relate to the

educational needs of each child.

Each child or group

approximately
of children in society should benefit

.

,
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equally from the educational system and
If an Individual
or group does not, then changes In
resource distribution

should be made to bring those groups In line
with the

achievement pattern of others.

Should schools push

for equality of achievement or for the excellence of
all
students?

There Is no simple answer to the equall tarlan-

libertarlan dilemma.
The ambiguous relationship between levels of

spending per pupil and academic achievement of students
poses another limitation to the study.

The Coleman

Report and numerous studies have concluded that Increases
in spending do not improve achievement, while still

other studies have found a positive relationship between

resource inputs (all of which are affected by the level
of spending)

and academic achievement 33

33por further information, see Alan Wilson,
"Educational Consequences of Segregation in a California
Community," Racial Isolation in the Public Schools
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Governmentprinting Office, 1967);
Thomas Pettigrew, "Race and Equal Opportunity," Harvard
Educational Review Vol. 38, No. 1, Winter 1968, pp. 6676; Thomas Ribich, "The Effect of Educational Spending
on Poverty Reduction," National Educational Finance
Project Vol. II, 1971; and Christopher Jencks, "A Reappraisal of the Most Controversial Education Document
of Our Time," New York. Times Magazine Aug. 10, 1969.
For studies that relate resource inputs positively
with achievement, see James W. Guthrie, et al
Schools and Inequality National Urban Coalition, 1969.
.

.

,

,

.

,

.
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The Significance of the Study

There are a number of people who are concerned
about and are studying the problems of school finance.

Several books and many articles have been written exploring
the legal and financial issues Involved in the question
of inequalities caused by state school financing systems.

Yet none of these works has tied together all the aspects
of the problem so that a comprehensive picture of the

problem and alternative solutions emerge.

The urgency

of such a study is dramatized when the different crises

facing education are identified (the fiscal, legal and
educational)

.

The various state legislatures face the

task of restructuring their school financing schemes
because of the legal attacks on the inequalities in
school spending.

The study should provide an important

information base for educators and legislators.

The

meaning of the recent court decisions on school finance
need to be clarified.

It is crucial that the alternative

models for school finance be defined and evaluated in
the context of these decisions.

This study is an outgrowth of the author's

experiences with the Massachusetts Task Force for Equity
in Education which was established by the University of

Massachusetts in beptember, 1971.

,

CHAPTER

II

REVIEW OP THE LITERATURE
Chapter II Is organized into two sections.
The first section will review the literature which

described the per pupil spending inequities between
school districts and the legislative attempts to equalize

spending through various state aid plans.

The second

section will focus on the literature which explored the

constitutional questions that relate to the per pupil

spending disparities between school districts.

This

section will concentrate primarily on Arthur Wise's

book;,

Rich schools. Poor Schools and John Coons', William
Clune's and Stephen Sugarman's book, Private Wealth and
Public Education .

Wise and Coons collectively developed

the concept of a constitutional challenge to the spending

disparities in 1962, 1 but have pursued different approaches
to the same problem since then.

Both books provide an

analysis of the legal and economic issues Involved in
the question of inequities in school finance.

The differences

Ijoel Burke, "Equality of Educational OpporSome Unresolved Educational Policy Issues,"
tunity:
California Supreme Court Decision ( Serrano v. Priest
(Los Angeles: University of California, Nov. 12, 1971),
)

P.

36.

2g

,
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In legal approaches which evolved between Wise and

Coons,

et al ,

led to opposite verdicts In sultB Involving

per pupil spending inequities between school districts.
In addition, supporting literature which dealt with

equal protection constitutional analysis and spending

disparities will be examined.
Per Pupil Spending Disparities and State Aid
It has been apparent for over seventy years

that there have been wide disparities in spending between

school districts, but little equalization has been achieved
in that time.

In 1905,

li.P.

Cubberley observed that poor

districts were forced to tax at many times the rate of
rich districts to support local schools.

p

He was

primarily concerned with the school districts' ability
to support education, rather than in equalizing spending

disparities between districts.

Cubberley proposed that

a flat grant be provided to all school districts by the

state to facilitate the maintenance of local schools,
but with a maximum of local financial support and a minimum of state support.

^

State aid was to be distributed

teachers
to school districts on the basis of the number of
2g.p. Cubberley, School Funds and ihelr ApporColumbia Teacher's College, 1905)
tlonment, (New York:
p.

15.

^Ibld.

,

p.

219.
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employed by tne districts rather than on the basis
of the
number of students attending the schools. Poor school

districts were still forced to tax at higher rates and
spend at lower levels than wealthy districts.

The flat

grant has historically been funded at inadequate levels,
and all districts, irrespective of wealth, receive flat
grants.

The local property tax remained the principal

source of educational revenue for local schools. 2*
flat grant, as conceived by Cubberley, did little

The
to

remove local wealth as the determining factor in school
spending.

During the 1920's, the foundation plan emerged
in various states as a method for distributing state aid
to local school districts.

George otrayer and R.H. Haig

developed the concept of the foundation plan from their

work with the Educational Finance Inquiry Commission
(1921-1924) and expanded it in their book, Financing
of Education in the State of New York in 1923.

foundation plan established

a

The

dollar minimum level of

spending per pupil at which the state would support
To qualify for the foundation program,

public education.

a local school district had to tax at a stipulated rate

which was generally set at a low level.

If the amount

of money raised by the local school district, at the
4 Ibid.

,

p.

219.
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stipulated state tax rate, was not as much as the foundation level, then the state provided enough money to bring

the district up to the foundation level.

Districts were

allowed to tax at higher rates than the one established
by the state, and they were allowed to keep all the

additional revenue raised.

Paul Mort, in State Support for Public Schools
(published in 1926), modified the basic foundation plan
by adding student weighting and focussing on the issue of
the district's ability to pay for schools.

Unfortunately,

the foundation plan had many weaknesses and has had very

little equalizing effect on local school district spending.

The most obvious weakness of the foundation plan is its

political sensitivity.
The state legislatures have generally compro-

mised the equalizing aspect of the foundation plan for
the political interest of their constituency.

The result

of the political vulnerability of the foundation plan

has resulted in low levels of guaranteed support to

local school districts and low levels of taxation.

Required foundation plans are often coupled with flat
grants which have an anti-equalizing effect, and this
adds to the spending disparities between school districts

rather than alleviating them.

The foundation plan has

been the primary method of state support for public

.
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education and over two-thirds of the states use some
form of the foundation plan.

Harlan Updegraff developed a new concept in
state school support in 1922. 5

After he had identified

the spending disparities between school districts,

Updegraff proposed

a

variable level foundation. ^

His

plan was designed to reward school districts that taxed
at higher efforts and also to equalize disparate levels
of spending between school districts.

Updegraff'

sals were not accepted during his lifetime.

s

propo-

His theories

on state school support later became known as the percen-

tage equalizing plan which Eric Lindman reintroduced in
the 1930's. ^

Again the percentage equalizing plan failed

to attract the attention of school financiers.

Charles Benson, a nationally known educational

finance expert, popularized the percentage equalizing
plan in his book, The Cheerful Prospect .^

Benson

thoroughly documented the spending disparities between
local school districts and argued convincingly for a

York:

^Harlan Updegraff, Rural School jurvery of New
Ithaca: by author, 1922)
Financial Support
,

6 Ibid.

,

p.

(

117.

^Eric Lindman, "Implementing a School Finance
Alternative," California Supreme Court Decisions (Los
Angeles: University of California, Nov. 12, 1971), p. 25.
,

^Charles Benson, The Cheerful prospect
Houghton & Mifflin, 1965), PP* 90-9.
(Boston:

,

9

.
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percentage equalizing plan.

Yet, as of 1969, only five

states (Iowa, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania,

Rhode Island and Vermont) had adopted percentage equalizing plans.

Numerous writers have Identified the great

differences in educational spending between districts.
In 1930, Henry Morrison, writing in School Review

,

noted

that there were great inequities of wealth among school

districts and argued that these caused great inequalities
in educational opportunity. 10

He proposed that all local

school districts be abolished and that a state support and

administration plan be constructed.

Morrison's suggestions

never were well received, but the defects in school finance
that he described in 1930 persist today.

In 1961, James Conant identified the problem
in Slums and Suburbs .

He stated that the contrast in

money available to the schools in a wealthy suburb and
the schools of a large city "Jolts one's notion of the
11
meaning of equality of educational opportunity."

In 1961, Myron Lieberman described the fiscal inequities
9johns. et. al.. Altern ative Programs for
Financing iiducation, National Educational Finance Project,
1971,

P.'

2 J5

:

^Henry

C. Morrison, ochool Review

,

(Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1930]
11 James Conant, Slums and Suburbs
McCraw-Hill 1961), pp.2-3.
,

,

(New York:
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between school districts In an article In Language and

Concepts In .Education 12
.

Steven Weiss, In Public School

Finance and Reform (1970), examined the financial status
of New England's schools and found large Intrastate dis-

parities that exist In local wealth, school tax rates and
levels of spending between districts.

Inequality:

Quality of

l‘he

Suburban and Urban public Schools (1968),

a book; edited by C.V.

Laly, described the spending diffe-

rences between urban and suburban schools.

In 1969, the

Advisory Commission on Intergovernment Affairs, In its
report "State Aid to Local Governments

,

focussed a major

"

portion of the study on the inequities in school finance
and made recommendations that included a full-state
A study completed in 19^9 by

assumption of school costs.

Guthrie, Levin, Kleindorfer and Stout for the National

Urban Coalition, Schools and Inequality

,

concluded that

the wide differences in spending between districts had an

students in poor school

impact on pupil achievement,

districts performed at lower levels than pupils in nighexpenditure districts.

This conclusion was contrary to

1
the Coleman Report's conclusions. ^

Ihe Coleman Report

spending
indicated that there were wide disparities in

"Equality of Educational

12^iyron Lieberman,

Opportunity," Language and Concepts in Education,
p"!
127 *
Rand McNally, 196l)
York:

(New

,

Schools and Inequality,
al .
(National Urban Coalition, 1969T» P-

^Guthrie,

et.

,
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between schools and school districts, but that
the
students'

home life accounted for the differences that

resulted In achievement which occurred rather than
the

spending differences. 14
the National .educational Finance Project,

directed by R.L. Johns and financed primarily by title

V

money, has published five volumes over the past four years
on educational finance.

The N.E.F.P.'s studies, the most

complete and current collection of information on school
finance thus far compiled, were an excellent source of
information.

Volumes IV and V provided information on

school spending disparities (interstate, interdistrict
and intradistrict), the impact of state and federal aid
on schools, school district organization and criteria for

evaluating state financing plans.
The New York State Commission on the Quality.

Cost and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education

Repo rt was a valuable document in the preparation of tnis
This study, known as the Flelschman Commission

study.

Report

,

provided information on the inequalities in

spending between and within school districts in New York

State and recommended that the state assume the full costs
of supporting education.

The recommendations in the

Flelschman Commission Report are the most complete to
l4 Coleman,

Opportunity

,

et.

1966, p. 22.

a1

.

,

Equality of Educational
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date and should serve as one model for a full-state

support plan for financing schools.
It has been obvious that disparities in levels
of spending between school districts have been around
for
a long time,

and it is just as obvious that the attempts

to equalize the disparities have not been successful

through the legislative process.

The next section focusses

on the legal analysis of the spending disparities, and how

the attack on them began in the courts.

Constitutional Analysis of Per Pupil Spending Disparities
This portion of the review of the literature

will examine the development of the constitutional analysis

under which an equal protection challenge to the interdistrict spending inequalities was mounted.

This section

will focus on the two principle works in the field:
Arthur Wise's Rich Schools. Poor Schools and Coons, Clune
and jugarman's Private Wealth and Public Education

.

Both books have been instrumental in the process which
led to a successful constitutional challenge of inter-

district spending disparities.
In 1968, Arthur Wise's Rich Schools, Poor Schools
was published as an outgrowth of his doctoral disserta-

tion at the University of Chicago.

person to do

a

Wise was the first

thorough analysis of the possible arguments
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that could be used in

a

constitutional challenge of the

spending disparities between school districts.

He leads

the reader through a step-by-step historical analysis of

Jupreme Court decisions on whioh a possible constitutional
challenge could be mounted.

Wise traces the developments

in Supreme Court decisions in the areas of civil rights,

the rights of Indigent criminals and voter equality,

including the one-man-one-vote issue and the poll tax
issue. ^5

Using the recent Supreme Court decisions, he

constructed three alternative arguments which could be
chosen by the Supreme Court if it were to question the

constitutionality of school district spending inequalities
on the basis of local wealth.

The three tentative arguments were:
1.

"Discrimination in education on account of race is

unconstitutional.

Discrimination in orlminal proceedings

on acoount of poverty is unconstitutional,

iherefore,

discrimination in education on aocount of poverty is
unconstitutional.
2.

"Discrimination in eduoation on aooount of race is

unconstitutional.

Discrimination in legislative apportion-

ment on account of geography is unconstitutional,

there-

fore, discrimination in eduoation on account of geography
is unconstitutional.

^See Chapter
these cases.

III, p.57 for an explanation of

:
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3.

Li scriminatlon in education on account of race is

unconstitutional.

Discrimination in voting on account

of poverty is unconsti tutional

.

Therefore, discrimination

in education on account of poverty is unconstitutional."^

Based on his legal analysis of the recent court

decisions,

Wise felt that a suit challenging the disparities

in educational spending might receive a favorable decision

in the supreme Court.

Wise proceeded to examine various definitions of
equal educational opportunity.

His first example was a

negative definition which stated that equal educational

opportunity can not depend on the economic circumstances
of the child’s geographic location.

Wise felt that of all

the definitions of equal educational opportunity he examined,
the negative one had the best chance of being accepted by
the dupreme Court since it did not specify what the condi-

tions of equality were.
The Judicial arguments established by Wise in

Rich dchools. Poor Schools became the legal framework; for
a series of court cases which challenged state school

funding schemes in a number of states on the grounds that
the state school finance laws allegedly denied equal

l^Arthur Wise, Rich Schools, poor Schools
University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 167.
,

(Chicago

.

^

o

.
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protection of the laws to the students
in Mclnnis v. Shapiro

,-*-®

.

x

he plaintiffs

the most prominent case that grew

out of Wise's analysis, argued that a financing system

would only satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment if it distributed money on the basis of the "educational needs" of
the pupils.

i’hey

asserted that the spending disparities

between school districts caused by differentials in wealth
were unconstitutional.

Ihe legal arguments which Wise

established for attacking the inequities in school spending

were sidetracked on the issue of the "educational needs"
of the students in Mclnnis v. Shapiro and in Buruss

Wllkerson ^9
.

x'he

v.

suits were dismissed in both instances

by federal courts because they were considered to be

"non Justiciable. "

Ihis meant that the courts had no

"manageable standard" by which to determine when the

Constitution was satisfied or not. 20

Wise's neatly

^Mclnnis v. Shapiro 293 F. supp 327 (N.D. Ill
Mclnnis v. Qgllvle 394 US 322
affirmed
sub, nom.
1968)
(1969), Buruss v. Wllkerson 397 US 7^ (1970), .Detroit
Board of Education v. Michigan No. 10334-2 (Circuit Court,
Wayne County, Michigan, Filed Feb. 8, 1968)., S_er£ano__v.
priest 5 Cal. 3d. 584 (1971), Rodriguez v. San Antonio
The 3 err an and Rodriguez
40 Law Week 2398 (1972).
the
cases were modified from their original form dropping
the
of
needs
issue of spending based on the educational
students
.

l8McInnls v. Shapiro 293 F. supp 327 (N.D. 111.

1968

)

^Buruss

v.

Wllkerson 397 US 74 (1970).

^Subsequent decisions in New York and Maryland

precedents, oee
have used the Mclnnis decision for their
Mclnnis
46-53f"or a more complete analysis of
Chapter III
and its progeny.
,
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rationalized constitutional arguments which led to the
suits filed In Mclnnls and Buruss were dismissed because
the courts had been asked to make a decision they were

not capable of making or enforcing.
A different approach to the spending inequities

question was developed by John Coons, William Clune and

Stephen Sugarman In Private Wealth and Public Education.
They argued that a constitutional challenge

to

spending

inequities between school districts could still be made
even after the early setback in Mclnnls

.

Their book

traces the development of educational finance and shows how
the state finance systems formulated in the 1920's (the

foundation plan) have helped to perpetuate the unequal
intrastate distribution of resources through today.
After thoroughly documenting the wealth disparities in
various states and destroying the myths about the actual

equalization achieved by the present state aid plans, the
authors moved on to describe the district power equalized
21
system of school finance which they developed.

The district power equalizing scheme closely

resembles the ideal percentage equalizing system.

Under

this plan, a district's level of spending is solely a

function of its tax effort.
'X*

Every district that makes

effort receives 'y'dollars, no matter how much they

raise.

If that effort produces less than

Y
'

*

dollars,

21 3e e Chapter iv,pp. 109-13 for a more detailed
discussion of district power equalizing.

"
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then the state makes up the difference.

produces more than

1

Y

1

If that effort

dollars, then that money Is

turned over to the state which redistributes it to the
poor districts.
The central thrust of the last section of the

book was to establish "Proposition

I:

"The quality

of public education may not be a function of wealth

other than the total wealth of the state." 22

The authors

asserted that the spending inequalities were created by
the state governments through school finance legislation.

They examine the racial discrimination cases, the voter

rights cases and the indigent criminal cases and conclude
that wealth was a suspect classification when it affected
a

"fundamental interest.

23

They went on to argue that

education was a "fundamental interest" similar to those
in the desegragatlon, voter rights and indigent criminal

cases.

The authors asserted that education plays a

vital role in democracy, that it is so important states
have made it compulsory, that it benefits everyone, and

that education has a crucial impact on a man's future

both socially and economically.

For these reasons, the

22 John Coons, William Cltine and Stephen Sugarman,

Mass.:
Private Wealth and Public Education (Cambridge,
p. 304.
1970),
Press,
Belknap Press of Harvard University
complete
23see Chapter III,pp*35-6 for a^raore
legal analysis of "fundamental interest.
,
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authors argued that education was a fundamental interest. 2 ^
Goons, Clune and Sugarman avoided the problem
of having to define "equality of educational opportunity"

by stating that quality is determined by the level of

per pupil spending, and they thus avoided the legal prob-

lems of trying to define equality of educational opportu-

nity and "educational needs" which was the Judicial downfall of the suits based on Wise's constitutional analysis.
The constitutional arguments so artfully constructed by
the authors of Private Wealth and Public education became

the central focus and legal basis for the Serrano

Priest decision,

v.

rhe California Supreme Court ruled that

California's school financing scheme was unconstitutional.
It argued, as Coons did, that the differences in levels
of spending between school districts were a function of

wealth rather than choice.

The opinion in Serrano

v.

priest follows consistently the arguments developed in

private Wealth and Public education

.

Other writers were also interested in the legal
issues involved in the spending disparities question.

Phillip Kurland,

a

noted constitutional authority, in

an article entitled "Equal Educational Opportunity:

The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined,"
^Xhis line of reasoning was followed by the
erran£
Supreme Court of the State of California in the 3
v. Priest opinion.
2

•
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expressed reservations about using the equal protection

clause as a vehicle for attempting to achieve equalization of educational expenditures 26

^e f e it that the

.

state legislature was the proper authority for such change
since the problems involved were very complex 26
.

Kurland

argued that courts should deal with simple and enforceable
issues and the Mclnnis suit provided neither

enforceable standard.

a

simple nor

His constitutional analysis had

an important impact on the decision reached by the federal

district court in Mclnnis

v.

Shapiro

.

The large majority of articles which appeared
in the literature supported the concept of a judicial

assault on the inequities in spending for education
between districts.

Harold Horowitz and Diana Neitring

observed that where state and federal courts upheld

legislation which provided a local option, few of the
decisions involved suits that touched upon fundamental
interests. 2 ^

They observed that when fundamental

interest was involved, as in Brown

v.

Board of Education

pH

25 Phillip Kurland, "Equal Educational Opportunity:
The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined,"
University of Chicago Law Review Vol. XXXV, 1958> P» 583.
,

26 Ibid

.

,

p.

595.

Horowitz and Diana Neitring, "^qual
Protection Aspects of Inequalities in public Education
and Public Assistance Programs from Place to Place Within
_
a State," UCLA Law Review, 1968, Vol. XV, pp. 787 9«
2 ?Harold

26 Brown v. Board of Education 274 NS 483 (195^0

.
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that the local option fell along with the state's power
to impose the discriminatory legislation upon all of its

territory.

Horowitz' and Neitring's study provided an

important support for Coons', dune's and Sugarman's
thesis.

David Kirp, in rhe Poor, The Schools and Equal
,f

Protection," argued that the poor should seek equalization
of school spending through judicial involvement

asserted that education was

a

He

fundamental right in the

same way that a right to a trial and the right to vote
are, and that these rights can not be denied on the basis

Kirp advocated challenging school

of a person's poverty.

district boundaries following the lead of the voter rights
cases or challenging the state aid formulas as suggested
by Arthur Wise.

John illard and Diane White, in an article in
the Wisconsin Law Review entitled "Inequalities in Public

Education," discussed the legal framework for the consti-7

tutlonal challenge of interdistrict spending inequalities.

Silard and White argued that the criteria that the federal
2 ^David Kirp,

"The Poor, The schools and Equal
Protection," Harvard Education Review V ol. 38* No. 4,
Pall 1968, pp. 63 ^- 68
,

,

3°john Silard and Diane White, "Intrastate
Inequalities in Public Education: The Case for Judicial
Relief Under the Equal protection Clause," Wisconsin
No. 1, 1970, pp. 5-3^.
Law Review, V ol.
,

O
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district court used to decide the Mclnnis case was nonjus ticlable were debatable.

They did not offer an alter-

native way to attack: the problem constitutionally.

Ferdinand Schoettle, in a very thorough article
in the Columbia Law Review

,

examined the nature of the

spending inequities, reviewed and summarized the equal

protection analysis that led to the Serrano decision. 31
He assessed the role of the court in protecting the poor

against inequities in public education and concluded
that

S

errano and its progeny were on shaky constitutional

ground since recent court decisions involving fundamental

interests and poverty

(

Dandridge

v.

Wllllams 32 and

James v, Valtlerra 33) cast serious doubt on whether the
status of poverty merits strict scrutiny under the equal

protection clause.

He felt that the conservative makeup

of the present Supreme Court was another reason why
S

errano was on thin judicial ice.

He suggested that the

taxpayers were disadvantaged and that spending inequalities could be attacked in a roundabout method by attacking

the unequal tax levies of different school districts.

-^Ferdinand Schoettle, "The Equal Protection
Clause in Public Education," Columbia Law Review Vol.
71, December 1971, No. 8, pp. 135^-141$.
,

32 pandrldge v.

33james

v.

Williams 397 US 471 (1970).

Valtlerra 402 US 137 (1971).
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Two men starting with the same Idea ended up

with different approaches to the problem of disparities
in spending between school districts.

ihe legal results

of the different approaches will be examined in the

next chapter which focusses on the litigation of Mclnnls
v,

ohaplro (Wise's judicial approach) and Jerrano

(Coons, Clune and Sugarman's approach).

v.

Priest

a

2

CHAPTER III
REVIEW OP THE LITIGATION:
MCINNIS V. SHAPIRO AND SERRANO V. PRIEST
The first attempt to achieve a constitutional

invalidation of a state's school financing system was
initiated in Detroit, Michigan, in February of 1968.

Although the suit was quickly bogged down in the Michigan
court system, it served as a model complaint for other
In mid-April, a similar complaint was filed

states.

in Illinois before a three-judge federal district court.

Before the year was over, the three- judge district court
had dismissed the suit for lack of merit.

Shapiro

^-

Mclnnis

v.

was appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court,

and by March of 1969, the Supreme Court had summarily

affirmed the district court's decision without oral

argument or opinion.-^
^•

111

.

Mclnnis

v.

Thus, the first attempt to have

Shapiro 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D.

1968 ).

decision in a federal district court can be
appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
2

^The U.S. Supreme Court decides most of its
cases by denying certiorari or denying to hear the
to
cases, and thus allowing the lower court decision
stand.
45
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a state' s school financing system declared unconstitu-

tional failed for reasons which are here examined.

Mclnnls v. Shapiro was the first constitutional

challenge to a state's school financing scheme to proceed
through the courts.

The suit was brought by lawyers

associated with the Office of Economic Opportunity Legal

Services Program on behalf of parents of seven Chicago
school children who resided in four Cook County school

districts.

It challenged the legality of the Illinois

school financing system which relies primarily on local

property tax revenues for money in each school district.
The plaintiffs claim that these statutes violate
their fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection and due process because they permit wide
variations in the expenditures per student from
district to district, thereby providing some
students with a good education and depriving
others, who have equal or greater educational
need.^

The three-judge federal district court stated:
The underlying rationale of the complaint is that
only a financing system which apportions public
funds according to educational needs of the 5
students satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment.The Illinois school funding scheme was scrutinized closely
by the district court.

It was noted in the decision

that in 1966-67, the 1,300 school districts spent on the
^ Mclnnls v. Shapiro
5 ibid.

,

p.

331

,

p.

329.

6
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average $840 per pupil, of which 75 per cent came from
local sources.

Twenty per cent was derived from state

sources, and five per cent came from federal aid.

The

court noted that the wealth of individual districts

varied widely, and per pupil expenditure varied between
$480 and $1,000 per pupil.

Illinois has a foundation program which guarantees $400 per pupil.

A flat grant of $97 per elementary

pupil and $54 per high-school pupil is provided to each
district on a per pupil basis.
for one- third of the state aid.

The flat grant accounts

Equalizing grants are

awarded to districts which levied a minimum rate and did
not derive $400 per pupil.

The equalizing aid made up

the difference between the $400 foundation level and the

actual amount of revenue raised.

The court concluded:

Thus, the equalization grant tends to compensate
for variations in property value per pupil from
one district to another.

The court said that inequalities of the existing
system were apparent, but that they were not unconstitutional.

The court observed that the legislature had

provided for decentralization of taxation and decision

making so local communities could choose which services
they valued most highly.

Some may choose police protec-

tion, fire protection or improved roads over education.

^Ibld.

,

p.

330.

.
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This decentralization of control to allow for local

choice and experimentation was rational according to
the court because the state had guaranteed all school

districts $400 per pupil.

The legal bases of the plaintiff's suit were
on the recent U. S. Supreme Court decisions in school

desegregation, voting rights and criminal justice.?

The Mclnnis court was not convinced and cited the fact
that Brown v. Board of Education ^ and Hobson

v,

Hansem ^

did not undermine the validity of Illinois' public

financing system because in those cases, the classifying
factor was race, not wealth.
Actually, there is little direct precedent
because the contentions now presented are
novel. But, the few relevant cases indicate
that plaintiffs must resort to the legislature rather than the courts.

?Some of the cases that were important in laying
the ground work for the school finance cases were:
(1) desegregation cases -- Brown v. Board of Education
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hall vT"5t. Helena parish Scho ol
Board 368 U.S. 515 (1962): and Griffin v. County School
Board 322 F. 2d. 322 (1963); and (2) indigent criminal
Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956); and
cases
Gideon v. WalnwrTght 372 if.S. 335 (1963).

—

^ Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
^Hobson v. Hansen 269 F. Supp.

401 (1967)

^According to the federal district court,

the

students were not deprived of their civil rights because
guarantees on per pupil spending do not exist. See
LaBeauf v. State Board of Educ ation 224 F. Supp. 256
Iv./T). T,a
1965 Tand Hess v7 Muldaney 213 F. 2d. 15
Alaska, 40 (9th Circuit 1954)

"
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The court said:

Even if the Fourteenth Amendment required that
expenditures be made only on the basis of pupils'
educational needs, this controversy would be
non Justiciable. 41
The court felt it could not determine when the Consti-

tution would be satisfied or when it was being violated,

because there was no "discoverable and manageable
standard. "12

The CO urt went on to describe the problems

of using "educational needs" as a yardstick to measure

equality of educational opportunity.

It stated that

disadvantaged children should receive more rather than
equal expenditures, and that a rule forcing equal expen-

ditures would really be unequal.

Thus, the complaint

demonstrated no cause of action because "the Fourteenth

Amendment does not require public school expenditures
be made only on the basis of pupils'

educational needs, "15

and because of the lack of a Judicially manageable
standard.

In addition, the court rejected the applica-

bility of the strict scrutiny equal protection standard,

because "the legislature designed the school financing

HBy

stating that Mclnnls was "nonjustlciable,
it could find no "discoverable and manageable
meant
the court
standard" by which the Constitution would be satisfied
or when it would be violated. Thus, the court had no
way of making a ruling in favor of the defendants, even
if it had found a constitutional violation in the Illinois
school financing system. See Mclnnls v. Shapiro p. 335*
,

12 Ibld.

15 Ibid
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system to allow Individual localities to determine
their
own tax burden. 1^

Buruss v. Wllkerson I 5. a case similar to Mclnnls

.

was dismissed in Virginia, and the court relied on the

Mclnnls decision for its precedent.

The Mclnnls and

g uruss decisions were both appealed to the U. 3. Supreme

Court and both were affirmed summarily without opinions
or oral arguments

Wllkerson l7)

(

Mclnnls v. Ogllvle

^

The first Judicial attack

,

and Buruss v .
on the inequi-

table methods in which schools are financed was a failure

primarily because it was tied to the concept of "educational needs."

The court observed that the plaintiffs did not
offer a definition for "educational needs" and stated
that it understood "educational needs" to be:
the interaction of several factors such as
.
•
.
the quality of teachers, the student's potential,
prior education, enviornraental and parental upbringing, and the school's physical plant.
Evaluation of these variables necessarily requires
detailed research and study, with concommitant
decentralization so each school and pupil may
be individually evaluated. 18
l^Ibid.

,

l^Buruss
Va. 1969).

p.

536.

v.

Wilkerson 310 F. Supp. 572 (D.

l^ McInnls v. Ogllvle 397 U.S. 422 (1969).

l^Buruss

v.

Wilkerson 397 U.S. 74 (1970).

l^ McInnls v. Shaptiro

,

p.

329.

W.
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The court's understanding of "this nebulouB
concept'!
Is as accurate as any educator's, and that Is
the problem.

if educators don't agree on a definition for

"educational needs," how could the federal district
court be expected to develop a Judicial standard to

determine when a student's educational needs were or
were not being met through the distribution of school

revenue?

A second reason that Mclnnls was dismissed by
the court was that two alternative methods for Improving

school finance In Illinois were suggested by the plaintiffs.

The first suggestion was that all students receive

the same dollar expenditures.

The second alternative

would be for the state to "syphon off all money In
excess of $400 per pupil which was produced by a given
tax rate, In effect eliminating variations in local

property values while leaving districts free to establish
their own tax rate"^9
plan).

(

a district power equalization

The court stated that changes in "the allocation

of public revenues Is a basic policy decision more

appropriately handled by a legislature than

a court." 20

Thus, the court avoided making a policy decision that It
19 Ibld.

,

p.

329

20 Ibld..

p.

335
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was In no position to carry out and also
avoided a cer-

tain political conflict with the legislature.

Coons,

Clune and Sugarman accurately observed that the decision
in Mclnnis:

... was the predictable consequence of an
effort to force the court to a precipitous and
decisive action upon a novel and complex issue
for which neither it nor the parties were ready. 21
However, the movement for equity in school

finance in the courts was not dead.

A suit which had

originally been patterned after Mclnnis

.

but later modi-

fied, was filed in Los Angeles, California in 1968.

On August 3if 1971, the Supreme Court of the State of

California decided the case of Serrano

v.

Priest 22
.

The six-to-one ruling declared that California's school

financing scheme denied equal protection and that it:
invidiously discriminates against the poor
.
.
.
because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and
neighbors. Recognizing as we must that the right
to an education in our public schools is a "fundamental interest" which cannot be conditioned on
wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose
necessitating the present method of financing.
We have concluded, therefore, that such a system
cannot withstand constitutional challenge and
must fall before the equal protection clause. 2 3
21 John Coons, William Clune and Stephen Sugarman,
Private Wealth and public Education (Cambridge, Mass:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 312.
,

22 Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d.
2 3serrano v.

Priest, p. 632.

584-

(1971).
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Concisely stated, that Is the essence of the Serrano
decision, but It is necessary to examine the case more

closely to distinguish it from Mclnnls and to try to

determine what the court meant.
The court first examined California's school

financing system.

Wide variances in spending per pupil

were evident when the school districts in Los Angeles

County were examined.

These disparities in spending

occurred because of the large differences in local wealth
as measured by assessed valuation per ohild.

Statewide,

the principle source of school money (55.7 per cent in
1968^69) was the local property tax in each school district.

State aid provided for 35.5 per cent of the money

for local schools, while federal aid made up about 9.8
per cent of the funds.

California had a "foundations

program" which guaranteed a minimum support of $355 per

elementary and $488 per secondary student.
supplied in two basic forms:

(1)

The aid was

basic aid ($125 per

pupil regardless of district wealth), and (2) equaliza-

tion aid (which was distributed Inversely to the wealth
of the district).

If local taxes and basic state aid

failed to bring a school district's spending to the
foundations' minimum, then equalizing aid made up the

difference.

The equalizing aid helped close some of the

gaps, but wide differentials still existed.

In 1968-69,
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Baldwin Park spent $577 per child, Pasadena spent
$840 per child, and Beverly Hills spent $1,231 per child.

Baldwin Park residents could not, however, be said

to

care less for education than Beverly Hills residents,

because they were taxing themselves at twice the rate
(5.48 per $100 pf assessed valuation v. 2.39 per $100).

The court stated:
The source of disparities is unmistakeable; in
Baldwin park, the assessed valuation per child
totalled only $3,706; in Pasadena, assessed
valuation was $13,706; while in Beverly Hills,
a ratio
the corresponding figure was $50,885

—

of 1 to 4 to 13. 24

The court further stated:

Furthermore, basic aid, which constitutes
about half of the state funds, actually widens
the gap between rich and poor districts. 5
Thus, Beverly Hills receives the $125 flat grant while

not qualifying for equalizing aid.

The flat grant

enlarges the economic chasm between Beverly Hills and

Baldwin park. 2 ^
After the factual analysis of California's school

financing system, the court began its three-step constitutional analysis by examining the question of which
equal protection test to use:

the rational basis test

In general, the U. S. Supreme Court

or strict scrutiny.
2 4 Ibid.

,

p.

604.

2 5ibld .

,

p.

608.

for a
26s ee Table 1 on page 88 in Chapter IV
antian
has
further explanation of how a flat grant

equalizing impact.
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has shown restraint in reviewing the
constitutionality
of state economic laws. 2 ?

it has merely required that

the laws bear a "rational relationship to a
conceivable

legitimate state purpose." 2 ®

Conversely, it has held

that in cases involving "suspect classifications"
or

touching upon "fundamental interests" that strict scrutiny must be applied. 2 9

Under strict scrutiny, the state

law must demonstrate that the distinctions drawn are

"necessary to further a compelling state purpose. "50
The court said that wealth was a suspect classification

and education was a "fundamental interest."
2 ? S errano

28 Ibld .

.

.

p.

p.

608.

609.

2 9strict

scrutiny equal protection standard is
a constitutional test applied to cases that are held to
involve "suspect classifications" or touching upon "fun-

damental interests." When the U.S. Supreme Court reviews
the constitutionality of state economic laws, it generally
uses the "rational basis test." To meet this test, the
law must merely demonstrate that it bears a rational
relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.
Conversely, under the tougher "strict scrutiny test," the
state must prove that legislation is " necessary to
further a compelling state interest." A ^suspect
classification" is "suspect" when a court will invalidate the classification unless it can be shown to be
"necessary" in the service of some "compelling state
Compellingness means that the "challenged"
interest."
classification must be strictly relevant to whatever
purpose is claimed by the state and in the fairest and
least restrictive way. For additional information, see:
Frank: Michelman, "The Supreme Court, 1968 Term Forward:
On protecting the poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment,
Harvard Law Review, Vol, 83, 1969, pp. 28-30.
'!

50s errano v. Priest, p. 609.
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The plaintiffs had contended that the school

funding scheme classified on the basis of wealth.

The

court, relying on its initial factual analysis, stated:
"We find this proposition irrefutable."^ 1

The defendant's

arguments that the system did not discriminate on the
basis of wealth were dismissed as "groundless" according
to the court. 52

The second step in the court's analysis was to

determine if education was a fundamental interest.

The

court related that until recently, wealth classifications
have been declared unconstitutional only in conjunction

with two fundamental interests

Harper

v.

—

voting rights (i.e.

Vlrg;lnla 33) and right of defendants in

criminal cases (i.e. Griffin v. Illinois^ ).

The

plaintiffs contended that education was a "fundamental
interest" and, therefore, could not be conditioned on
wealth.

The court agreed, even while noting that there

was no direct legal precedent.

It examined the "indis-

pensable role" education plays as a key determining
factor in an individual's chances for economic and social
success In American society.
31 ibld .

,

p.

610.

32jbld.

,

p.

610.

The fundamental Importance

33 Harper v. Virginia 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
34flrlffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 122 (1956).
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of education was demonstrated In Brown v.
Board of

Education 347 U.S. 183, (1954).
education

The court cited

as a determining Influence in the development

of citizens. "55

it noted that an unequal education led

to unequal Job opportunities and lower income.

The

court drew anologies between education and Indigent

criminal rights and voting rights.

man

s

It stated that a

wealth should not determine his chances for a

fair trial, nor should a man's address determine the

weight of his vote.

Furthermore, wealth or a parent's

address should not determine the quality of a child's
education.

The court concluded that education was a

fundamental interest for the following reasons:
a)

education was essential for the maintenance of

individual opportunities, and the preservation of "free
enterprise democracy;"
relevant;

c)

b)

education is universally

public education continues over a lengthy

period of time;

d)

education is unmatched in the extent

to which it molds the personality of the youth of

society; and finally,

e)

education is so important that

the state has made it compulsory.

The court thus needed to determine whether the

California school financing scheme was necessary to
achieve a compelling state purpose.

This aspect of

the suit touched upon the crucial question of autonomy
5^s errano, p. 615.
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of the. local school districts.

It separated the Issue

of local control Into two components:

making In administration and

(2)

(1)

local decision-

promotion of local fiscal

control over expenditures for education.

The court said

that no matter how large a portion was financed by
the
state, the decision-making power could be left in the

hands of the local school districts.

It concluded, there-

fore, that local school finance systems were not necessary
to the administration of local schools.

As for the

question of local control over the level of spending,
the court said:

"Under the present financing system, such

fiscal freewill is a cruel illusion for poor districts ." 36
If assessed valuation is the main determinant of how much
a district spends for schools,

then only a district with

a large tax base can fully choose how much it really cares

about education.

The court concluded that the present

funding scheme actually deprives the poor districts of the
option to choose how much it cares about education, and
even if local funding presented a compelling state interest,

there were less onerous alternatives which would permit all

local school districts equal choice in how much it cares

about education.
The court next dealt with the question of territorial uniformity.

The defendants contended that territorial

uniformity was not required in school finance.
3 6 Ibld.

,

p.

620.

The court
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did not agree and cited the voter apportionment cases as
a reference,

"If a voter's address may not determine the

weight to which his ballot is entitled, surely it should
not determine the quality of his child's education.

There has been disagreement over what the court meant
in its analysis of the territorial uniformity question.
Jack: Coons,

lawyer and co-author of Private Wealth and

Public Education

.

interpreted the court as referring

to the issue of equality of tax effort over a geographic

region.

Arthur Wise, author of Rich Schools. Poor Schools

,

interpreted the court as having said that there must be
equality of expenditure throughout the region.

Coons'

analysis seens the most consistent with the rest of the
opinion.

The court concluded that the present fiscal

arrangements for school in California were not necessary
to promote a compelling state interest and, therefore,

did not withstand the "strict scrutiny" test.
It next dealt

with the question of the applicability

of the Mclnnls precedent, which the defendants strenuously

used to argue that the question had already been decided.
The opinion stated that even though the U.S. Supreme

Court had affirmed Mclnnls and Buruss, it did not close
the question.

The court said that the Issues were sub-

stantially different from those in Mclnnls
37ibld, p. 622

.

In Mclnnls,

.
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the plaintiffs emphasized the concept of
"educational

needs" as the proper standard for measuring school

financing against the equal protection clause. 38
The California Supreme Court felt that it was not faced

with the same question, and so it dispensed with the

Mclnnls challenge.
Serrano was decided on a motion to dismiss and
hence was argued on the assumption that the plaintiffs'

facts were true.

The court was satisfied that the plain-

tiffs had alleged facts showing that discrimination did
exist.

The earlier judgement of the Los Angeles Superior

Court was reversed, and the case was remanded to the
trial court for a hearing on the truth of the alleged

facts
The

S

errano decision may prove to be the most

important court decision for education since Brown
Board of Education in

1954-.

v.

But the decision is tentative,

which the California Supreme Court went out of its way
to

emphasize in an October 21, 1971 clarification.

It pointed out that it had not yet actually struck

down the California school funding scheme, but had merely

ordered the trial court to examine the facts.

If the

trial court then determines that the alleged facts are
true, however, it must find the system unconstitutional.

38xbid.

,

p.

23.

61

The S errano decision has served as a catalyst
In school finance decisions.

Since late August, 1971,

there have been four similar decisions that have used
errano as a Judicial precedent.

S

The cases were

Van Dusartz v. Hatf leld -^(Mlnnesota)

San Antonio 40 (Texas), Robinson
Hollins

v.

Shof stall

v . HI nkl e^ ( Wy oml ng )

2*

-

2
(

Arizona)

v.
,

f

Rodriguez

v.

Cahill ^ (New Jersey),
1

and Sweetwater County

The Van Dusartz and Rodriquez

.

decisions were adjudicated in federal district courts,

while the Robinson and Hollins decisions were adjudicated
in state trial courts.

Each of the opinions relied

heavily on the Judicial rationale established in the
S errano opinion.

The Van Dusartz v. Hatfield decision struck
down the Minnesota school financing scheme, and it was
the second court decision to do so.

The Van Dusartz

holding modified the Serrano decision in an important
way by stating that the "quality of a child's education"
? 9 Van

Dusartz

^Rodriguez
^ Robinson

v.

v.

Hatfield 40 U.S.C.W.2228 (1971).

San Antonio 40 Law Week 2398 (1972).

Cahill Superior Court of New JerseyHudson County Docket No. L-i 8704-69 (1972).
v.

42 Ho lllns v. Shof stall Superior Court of ArizonaMaricopa County No. C-£b3032 (1972).

^Sweetwater County
Wyoming.

v.

Hinkle Docket No. 3998,

"
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may not be a function of wealth, other than that of
the
state's (as Serrano did). 44 Van Dusartz stated
that:

the level of spending for a child's education may not

be a function of wealth other than that of the state

as a whole. 4 5

This modification of the wealth of

neutrality principle, as it was established by Coons,
Clune and Sugarman, and accepted as the standard by
the California Supreme Court, is an important change.
It takes away the vulnerability of the plaintiff's

having to define "quality education," as measured in
dollars, and instead, moves the issue to a level of

spending per child, which is a much more manageable
standard.

The court did not prescribe a remedy, but

merely declared the present method unconstitutional.
The federal district court in Minnesota retained

Jurisdiction over the case, but deferred further action
until after the 1971-1972 Minnesota legislative session.

The Rodriguez
in nature to the

Texas'

S

v.

San Antonio decision is similar

errano and Van Dusartz decisions.

state school financing scheme was declared

unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
The Rodriguez decision was decided

protection clause.

by a three-judge federal district court, which means
4 4 S errano

,

p.

604.

4 5yan Dusartz v. Hatfield 40 U.S.L.W.

228 (1971).
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that a direct appeal can be made to the
United States

Supreme Court by the defendants.

On April

17,

1972,

the State of Texas filed its Jurisdictional
statement

with the Supreme Court for its appeal of the Rodriguez
decision.

^

The plaintiffs

(

Rodriguez responded to the
)

Texas Educational Agency's appeal within the thirty days

they were allowed, and on June

7,

1972,

the Supreme

Court decided to hear the Rodriguez case.

It will be

placed on the docket for the October 1972 session of
the Supreme Court, and a decision will be reached on
it during the session.

Two suits similar in nature to S errano and its

progeny, have been dismissed by the courts in New York
and Maryland.

In Spano v. Board of Education of Lake -

land Central School Dlstrlct ^declded by the Supreme

Court of the State of New York, County of Westchester
(a trial court),

was upheld.

the existing system of school finance

The trial court dismissed the suit on the

grounds that "the applicable law is contained in Mclnnls
and Buruss.^ 8

Judge Joseph Hawkins felt that the changes

46

.

Stephen Browning, of the Lawyer's Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, "Letter to Friends of the
School Finance Reform Movement," April 14, 1972, p.1.

^Spano

Board of Education of Lakeland
Central School District Supreme Court of the State of
New York, County of Westchester, Index No. 1056 (1972).
v.

48 Ibld, p. 6.
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in the school finance system "should be fashioned by

more supreme authority."^

He was referring to the

Legislature of New York and the United States Supreme
Court.

The Spano decision, however, has not been a real

setback for the school reform movement.

First, it was

adjudicated in a trial court, and secondly, it is the

reaffirmation of the Mclnnls decision that does not
seem relevant because of the change in focus from

"educational needs" to the issue of level of spending.
In a federal district court in Maryland, another

suit similar to

S

errano was dismissed.

In Parker v.

Mandel ^ 0 Judge Harvey specifically rejected the argument
that education is a "fundamental interest" and consequently
the application of the strict scrutiny test.

Instead,

the "rational basis" equal protection standard was applied

and the suit was dismissed.

The Spano and Parker decisions

seem to be two compelling reasons for the U.S. Supreme

Court to settle the apparent legal contradictions, as
it now has the opportunity to do because it chose to

hear the Rodriguez case.
The prospects of the Supreme Court upholding a

Serrano-type decision are not that optimistic, according
to many observers of the Court.

Ferdinand Schoettle,

a Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota,

^ Ibld

,

^Parker
Maryland

p

.

v.

thinks

10.

Mandel, Civil Action No.

71

“1089-8,
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that the Serrano decision Is on tenuous
Judicial ground.
He cited two recent United States Supreme Court
rulings

in cases dealing with poverty and the application of
the

strict scrutiny standard to support his claim.

Dandrldge v
though

.

In

Williams .-^ the Supreme Court stated that

it recognized that a ceiling placed on welfare

payments per household challenged one of the "most basic
economic needs of impoverished human beings," it could

find "no basis for applying a different constitutional
standard. "52

The Court thus upheld the welfare celling

placed on the households in Maryland, concluding that
the legislation dealt with "state regulations in the

social and economic field, not affecting freedoms

guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. "53
In J ames

v.

Valtlerra ,54 the U.S. Supreme Court

sustained the validity of a requirement of the California

Constitution that no low-rent housing projects could be

undertaken by the state without approval of the affected
A three- Judge federal district

community in a referendum.
51

pandrldge

v,

Williams 397 U.S., 471

(1970).

52perdinand Schoettle, "The Equal protection
Clause in Public Education," Columbia Law Review
Yol. 71, December 1971, No 8, p^ 13677
,

.

53xbid.

,

p.

.

1367.

54james v. Valtlerra 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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court held that this provision was a violation of the
equal protection clause on the grounds that it placed

burdens on the poor and minority groups not placed on

middle and upper class groups.

The Supreme Court reversed

the federal district court's ruling stating that

referenda

were a traditional feature of California

and America's democratic system of government.

John Coons argued, on the other hand, that the
Valtl erra decision:

actually supports the "fundamental! ty"
.
.
.
of the interest in education.
The Court
there emphasized the special Importance
of the democratic process exemplified
in local plebiscites.
That perspective
here assists pupil plaintiffs who ask
no more than equal capacity for voters
to raise money in tax referenda, thus
making the democratic process all the
more effective. 55

This line of reasoning was used by the Judge who wrote
the opinicn in the Van Dusartz v. Hatfield decision in

Minnesota.
Paul Dimond, a lawyer at Harvard's Center for

Law and Education described the Valtlerra decision
from a different point of view.

He supports Schoettle's

argument that the Valtlerra decision actually damages
the potential of a Serrano -type decision's chances

for a Supreme Court victory.

He observed that the

55s ee Footnote 9 in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield

.
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local millage election was in fact, very similar to the
local referendum regarding housing.

Dimond stated that

the court must be convinced:

... that education is somehow fundamentally
different from "housing"; despite all the
persuasive arguments and skills Coons
and company can muster on behalf of Proposition I (the wealth neutrality principle),
their constitutional argument may well be
less than convincing when it finally encounters the Supreme Court. 56
It is possible that the

S

errano principle may

face a harder constitutional fight because of decisions
in other areas than school finance.

Johnson

v.

One such case is

New York State Education Department 40 U.S.

L.W. 2127 (1971).

In Johnson

,

the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, in a two-to-one ruling, held that
fees for textbooks were not an Invidious discrimination
on the basis of wealth and that education was not a

"fundamental interest" as the plaintiffs had argued. 57
If the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the Johnson decision,

then Rodriguez will face an even harder time than is now

projected in the Supreme Court.
in the high court,

If Johnson should win

then it would improve Rodriguez

1

s

A Victory of Sorts
56paul Dimond, " Serrano
for Ethics, Not Necessarily for Education," Y ale Revie_w
of Law and Social Action, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1971>
:

p.

135.

57john Coons, William Clune and Stephen Sugarman,
and
"A First Appraisal of Serrano," Yale Review of Law
H2.
p.
Social Action, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1971,
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CHAPTER

IV

SCHOOL FINANCE INEQUITIES
AND
SOME POTENTIAL REMEDIES
The school financing crisis has been characterized
by the inequitable distribution of revenue among public school

districts and the inequitable method in which school

revenue has been raised.

It is the purpose of this chapter

to help define the nature of the school finance crisis,

briefly examine the significance of the
and

i18

S

to

errano decision

progeny for school finance, and to identify some

alternative remedies for the school finance crisis which
flow from the

S

errano decision.

N ature of the

School Finance Crisis

It has been apparent for some time that a crisis
in public school finance was inevitable.

been unmistakable.

The signs have

The squeeze between rising costs and

lagging revenues has finally caught up with education.

Growth in expenditures, for example, has
outrun the growth in the economy as a whole over
the last decade. Education has averaged a 9.7 per
cent annual growth in expenditures while the Gross
National product was averaging a 6.8 per cent
annual increase.
Ijoel Berke, "The Current Crisis in School
Finance: Inadequacy and Inequality," Phi Delta Kaplan,
September 1971, p. 2.
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School spending has increased as a per cent of the Gross
National Product from 3.1 per cent in 1929 to 7.5 per
cent in 1969. 2

The annual expenditure per pupil in public

elementary and secondary schools has Increased over
eight-fold from $108 in 1930 to $926 in 1970.

5

Although school enrollments have started to
level off, rising prices and the pressure of higher teacher
salaries will tend to push public school spending higher.

In addition to the obvious increased costs of education,
there are a number of indirect costs which are not included, but add another dimension to the crisis.

Ten per

cent of the students in America attend private schools,
which, though indirect to the cost of public education,
The

add significantly to the total cost of education.

cost of on-the-job training programs offered by industry
and the government are not included in the cost of public

education.

The largest single indirect cost of education

is the earnings which students do not receive because they

attend school.

Foregone earnings of students, aged 16-andabove, were estimated at between $20 and $30 billion
in 1967, assuming approximately 75 per cent of
them could have found employment if they so desired.
2 p^^rQg-t, of

Educational Statistics 197Q

3ibid.

58.

,

p.

»

P»

—

^Joel Berke and James Kelley, The Financial
Equality of Educa tional Opportunity
a q
P pn ts of
gqua
rn lchool ff Inane e,l he S elect Committee on
Opportunity, U.sT Senate, January 1972, p. 7.
-n

'

21.

76

Raising money to cover the ever-increasing costs
of education has required higher tax effort on
the part
of taxpayers.

The trend of increasing costs continues

with a major portion of the increase going to higher
teacher salaries.

Taxpayers are no longer automatically

approving increased school taxes and bond issues.

There

has been a taxpayer's revolt which has been putting a

financial squeeze on public schools.

Of the £39 billion

spent on public education in 1969-70, £20.1 billion (52.7
per cent) of that amount was raised at the local level

where the taxpayer has a direct say in school spending
via the vote.

^

In I960, only 11 per cent of the bond

issues put to voters were rejected.

By 1965, the rate

of rejection had increased to 33 per cent, and by 1970,

the rejection rate had climbed to 52 per cent.^

A

recent

Gallup Poll on education demonstrated that the majority
of voters sampled in the nation were against increased

taxes for schools:

40 per cent were for tax increases,

52 per cent were against tax increases and 8 per cent

had no opinion. ?

in California this past year, over

60 per cent of the proposed tax increases and bond Issues
^ Digest 1970

,

p.

51.

^Berke, "Current Crisis}' p. 3.

Kappan

,

^Gallup Poll on Education 1971, Phi Delta
September 1971, p. 38.
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were rejected by the local voters.

In Michigan, twenty

of twenty-five requests for the present tax rates
were

rejected. NewJersey

had more budgets rejected than at

any other time in its history.®

The budget and school

bond issue defeats have had a serious impact on the school

programs in communities that defeated the requests for

present levels or additional levels of tax revenue.
Staff reductions have been one response to the
lack of money in school districts with a resulting increase
in the pupil-teacher ratio.

Over 9,000 teachers were not

rehired in California this past year, while the school

enrollment Jumped by 100,000.

In Michigan, 248 adminis-

trators and 4,480 teachers were released in September,
1971.

The personnel area has not been the only aspect of

the school program to suffer.

The Dayton schools closed

completely for a time because of the lack of money, as
have other school districts throughout the country.

In

California in 1970-71, there were thirty school districts
that ran out of money before the school year ended.

Numerous experimental programs have ended because of
lack of revenue.

Cuts in spending have occurred in other

areas that are critical to the schools' program.

Spending

for guidance and psychological services have been cut.

Library services are another area where the budget cuts
®Berke, Current Crisis, p.

3.
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have been felt the hardest.

Certain non-academic courses

such as art and music have been dropped from some school

programs to keep down costs.

The fiscal problems in urban schools are even

more serious than fiscal problems in schools elsewhere.
The Riles Report (President Nixon's Task Force on Urban

Education) documented the problems thoroughly.

The

Report cites six key factors for the recent financial
crisis of urban areas:
1.

The population migration of the middle class from

central cities has meant that urban areas have suffered
a decrease in tax base.

Further, they have been

forced to provide transportation facilities, fire

protection and police protection to the commuters
while being drained of their tax base.
2.

Urban education costs more than suburban education
because of higher salary needs for teachers, the

large portions of money needed in educating the

"disadvantaged," the high cost of building sites
and construction, and the high maintenance costs.
3.

State aid formulas have

been

inadequate and in many

states add to the already large disparities in

spending per pupil.
4.

The dwindling public support for education for

urban areas has put a tighter squeeze on already
tight budgets.

9
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5»

ihe

1

liianclal difficulties of non-public schools haa

caused a large increase in central city schools putting
a further drain on the school budgets.
6.

The final reason

for the financial crisis in urban

schools has been the minimal impact of federal aid.
In 1969, federal funds accounted for only 7.3 per
cent of school budgets throughout the country.

The financial problems of urban schools are

further aggravated by legal, traditional and socioeconomic
constraints.

State constitutions, legislative mandates

and municipal policing powers all take precedence over the

school board's authority, thus restricting a school board's

budgetary autonomy.

The tendency of urban school systems

to be locked into civil service and inflexible personnel

systems acts as a serious constraint on urban schools.
Finally, two-thirds of the variation in per pupil expen-

ditures among the nation's largest 107 districts was

accounted for by the wealth of the district and the socioeconomic background of its population. 10

The role of the local property taxes in school

finance adds another dimension to the fiscal crisis.

The

property tax continues to carry the major burden for local
9ihe Riles Report (president Nixon's Task Force
on Urban Education), Congressional Record January 20,
1970, p. E 26.
,

10

Berke and Kelley, Financial Aspects

,

p.

24.
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governments' portion for support for education.

The local

property taxes account for 98 per cent of the revenue
raised locally by school districts, and the local school

districts provide 52 per cent of all monies for public
schools. 11

The heavy reliance on property tax revenue

has serious implications for taxpayers and educational

finance.

The major criticism of the property tax is that
it is a regressive tax that takes proportionally more from

minority and poor groups than it does from wealthier groups
in our society.

The property tax is paid directly out of

income whether an individual owns property or rents.

According to Alex Wynnyczuk, professor of Economics at
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, rents paid by tenants
are 15 to 20 per cent higher because of the use of the

property tax. 12

Dick Netzer, a nationally known property

tax expert, illustrated the regressiveness of the property

tax by stating:

Individuals who earn less than $2,000 per
year lose more than seven per cent of their income
to property taxes while persons making over
$15,000 per year pay about three per cent of
1^
their income to property taxes
.

.

.

lln Future Dimensions in Educational Finance,"

National Educational Finance Project, 1971

,

p.

9.

12 Alex Wynnyczuk, Letter to the Editor, N ew
York Times , February 18, 1972, p. 32.
of the Prop erty Tax,
Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 75.

^Lick Netzer, Economics
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Besides the regressiveness of the property tax, there are
a number of other negative features.

A serious problem of the property tax becomes

apparent when assessment practices are examined.

They are

often administered in ways that are arbitrary and discri-

minatory.

In practice, assessors generally are very good

at assessing the value of low and moderately priced housing

because that's where most of their experience takes place.

This means more than likely that the owner of such housing

will not get a break in the assessment of his property.
On the other hand, high-priced homes and valuable industrial property are not within the common experience of

most assessors.

It is the industrial, business and high-

value residential property where more of the arbitrariness
in assessment occurs.

Valuable properties are much more

likely to be undervalued than low and moderately-priced
housing, and this adds to the regressiveness of the pro-

perty tax. 1 ^
As would be expected, the property tax has

important implications for businesses.

If property taxes

new
are low in an area, then it will tend to encourage

businesses to enter the area.

If taxes are high, it will

tend to discourage new businesses from entering.

High

14^or more information on unequal patterns of
Ratios
Arron and Oldman, "A s sessment-Sale
assessment, see:
ax Journal,
Under the Boston Property Tax, National 1
s Econom i c s
Netzer
March 1965, Vol. l8, No. 1; and also,
,

of the Property Tax .
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taxes have, in fact, been encouraging
businesses already

located in the area to leave.

The property tax favors

businesses with a low ratio of property

to

sale.

There are still other weaknesses of the property
tax.

Revenues from the property tax have tended to lag

behind the National Income.

^-5

The property tax is so

heavily used that it often cannot yield the increased
revenues needed by school districts when they are desired.
The public school financing systems used in

American schools are characterized by inequities in both
the revenue raising and revenue distribution systems

that are used.

Under the present systems used to raise

revenue for school, it has been demonstrated that the
poorest communities very often receive lower quality

educational services as measured by the level of per pupil
expenditures.

Communities that have lower needs for

services or where the assessed valuation per pupil is

much higher enjoy higher spending levels for education and
lower tax rates for schools.

The present disparities in

local tax burdens and spending levels for public schools
stem from the heavy reliance on the local districts for
the support of schools.

In 1969-70, local districts

provided over half of the revenue spent on public education while almost all of the money raised locally came

from the local property tax.

puture Dimensions in Educational Finance,"

p.

9.

;
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The question of equalization of tax burden

needs to be explored.

The progressivi ty or regresslvlty

of the taxes used to support schools Is the critical factor

in determining the equality of the revenue raising side of

the fiscal crisis.

States use a wide variety of methods

to raise

money for schools -- the income taxes (personal and corporate), the sales tax, the property tax, the excise tax,
etc.

The progressivi ty and regresslvlty of a state's

school financial structure depends on the state's choice
of taxes.

The factors that determine the equity of the

tax system are the portion of revenue provided by the

federal, state and local governments, and the relative

progressivi ty of the taxes used. 16

The National Educa-

tional Finance Project concluded after studying school
tax structures in various states that:
(1)

The higher the percentage of state revenue
derived from relatively progressive sources,
the higher the progressivi ty of the tax

(2)

The higher the percentage of the state's
contribution as compared to local tax
revenue, the higher the progressivi ty of
the tax structure;
The higher the percentage of school revenue provided by federal funds, the higher
the progressivity of a state's school taxation system. 17

s

(3)

true tur e

i6 Johns,

al .. Alternative Programs for
Financing Schools Vol • V National Educational Finance
Project, 19tl, p. 269.
,

17ibid.

et.

,
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Equalized valuation per pupil has been the
measure used to assess a school district's wealth.

It

is calculated by dividing the local property tax base by

the number of children attending school in the district.
A district's ability to raise revenue for education is

clearly related to the wealth of the community.

8

The

second determinant in the level of local support of public

education is the school property tax rate.

A brief illus-

tration will demonstrate the importance of local wealth
and the school tax rate on expenditures for education.
If town A and town B were of equal size and had an equal

number of children attending school, but town A had twice
the assessed valuation per pupil that town B had, then

town B would have to double its school tax rate to raise
Put

the same amount of revenue for education as town A.

another way, if A and B had equal tax rates, then

would

A

raise twice as much money as B would for schools on a
per pupil basis.
It would seem logical for a legislature to

design a state school financing system so that It rewarded
tax effort.

This would mean that higher tax rates would

produce higher levels of spending.

The wealth differen-

this
tials that exist between school districts nullify

prospect.

financing
The actual effect of most state school

l8 Steven Weiss, Public School Finance and Reform,
4o, p. lo.
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970, No.
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schemes Is the opposite.

In fact, a consistent pattern

of Increasing spending at decreasing tax
rates appears
as one moves from the districts with the lowest
per pupil

assessed valuation to the districts with the highest
per pupil assessed valuation. 19

Widespread disparities

in the level of spending per pupil result from the wide

variations in the district’s wealth. ^0

Attempts have been made by states to equalize
the level of spending between districts through the use
of state aid plans. 21

Though state aid programs vary

widely in design and effect, there are two commonly-used
methods to distribute state aid:
the percentage equalizing plan.

the foundation plan and

The foundation plan,

or the Strayer-Haig formula which is used in over half
of the states,

sets a target level at which per pupil

expenditures will be supported by the state.

Generally,

a minimum tax rate is required in order to receive the

Unfortunately, foundation plans are

foundation aid.

generally set at very low levels.
19 Ibld

.

,

p.

No real equalization

20.

20 See Weiss, Public School Finance John Coons,
William Clune and Stephen Sugarman, Prlyate~~Wealth and
Public Education, (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1970), Berfce, "Current Crisis,"
and Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d 384 (1971).
,

21por a brief historical analysis of school
finance systems and their equalizing tendencies, see:
Coons, et. al. Private Wealth. and Public Education
.

,

2
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takes place because the spending la financed
from the

local districts where great disparities in
wealth exist.
Foundation plans are often combined with other
types of

state aid that neutralize the equalizing impact a
foundation plan could have.

In most cases, a flat grant is

tied to the foundation plan which actually has an anti-

equalizing effect. 22

See Table 1.

The percentage equalizing plan is used in
about one-third of the states.

It is designed to equalize

spending at all levels rather than at just one arbitrary
level.

A formula is used to determine the level of aid

to be provided to each district.

For example:

i.e., State Aid Ratio =(1- wealth ratio

of district "n")

=(1- (assessed valuation per
pupil of district "n")
assessed valuation of
key district)
(

If the wealth ratio is established using the richest

district, then the plan eliminates the wealth factor

completely and the same local tax effort will provide
the same level of expenditures regardless of wealth.

The theoretical form is, unfortunately, not used in any
state.

Modifications of the plan occur in the political

process which effectively block the operation of the

percentage equalizing plan.
that this may happen.
2 Ibid.

,

pp.

There are a number of ways

Most states using the percentage
106-108.
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equalizing plan guarantee a minimum level of state aid
for all districts, regardless of wealth, which has an
an ^i -equali zing effect.

A second way to limit the equa-

lization of the percentage grant is to place a ceiling
above which the state will not provide aid.

A third way

that a percentage equalizing formula can be subverted

from its intended effect is to refuse to require negative payments for districts that are wealthier than the
key district used to compute the state aid ratio.

In California, for instance, the flat grant

(called Basic Aid) of $125 per pupil actually widens
the gap between the rich and poor districts.

The table

on the next page will help to illustrate this point.

The net impact of the state aid plan, used

with the intention of eliminating the wealth disparities

between school districts, has been significant.
’’Actually,

states have succeeded in equalizing neither

tax burdens nor education services.

.

Inequities

."

in state school financing systems exist because of the

affects of political self-interest and political compro-

mise on the part of state legislators.

The legislative

route for changing the present state school financing
2 3weiss,

Publi 0 School

2 ^Berke and

/

,

pp.

35-36.

Kelley, Financial Aspects

,

p.

20.
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TABLE

1

REVENUE DISPARITIES IN CALIFORNIA
AND IMPACT OF STATE AID a
$1200
1100
1000

1162

$1037

Property Tax

900
Basic Aid

Revenue
=

Equalization
Aid

Pupil

mm

(1)

Foundations
program minimum
guarantee per
pupil at secondary level

Per

*1037

*1037

(2)

BP
BP
with without
basic basic
aid
aid

BH
BH
with without
basic basic
aid
aid

Conclusions:
(3)
Baldwin Park residents taxed themselves at twice the
rate but they were able to raise only l/5 the revenue that
Beverly Hills was able to raise ($203 vs. $1037 per pupil).
The basic aid grants ($125 per pupil) actually widens
The basic
the gap between the rich and poor districts.
aid grant is meaningless to Baldwin Park because the
equalization aid would bring Baldwin Park up to the
foundation's minimum, while the basic aid grant provides
extra revenue for Bevely Hills.
The flat grant is "Invisible money" to the poor school
districts and might as. well be earmarked for the rich ones.
a fhe table is based on 1968-69 Tax and State

Aid figures.
Baldwin Park: Tax Rate-$5.48 per $100 Assessed Valuation.
Tax Base-$3»706 Assessed Valuation per pipil.
Beverly Hills: Tax Rate-$2.38 per $100 Assessed Valuation.
Tax Base-$ 50,885 Assessed Valuation per pupil.

system has been very Ineffective for those reasons,
ihe court system has historically been an avenue for

change sought out by those who were Ineffective in

achieving such changes in the political system.

Thus,

the lack of progress in achieving reform of state school

financing systems in the legislature has moved the
struggle to the courts.
The Serrano Decision and Its Progeny

The inequities in school financing systems

described above have already been challenged in the
courts with Mclnnls

v.

Shapiro 2 ^

and.

Buruss

v,

Wllkerson 20
,

but not successfully until August 31, 1971, when the

Supreme Court of the State of California reached its
decision in Serrano

v,

priest

.

27

The Court declared

California's school financing system unconstitutional on
the grounds that it violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-

tution.

Since the six-to-one ruling occurred in Califor-

nia, there have been four decisions affirming the Serrano

principle and one ruling in which a similar suit lost.
2 ^McInnls v.

^ Buruss

y,

pQ

Shapiro 293 F. Supp. 327 (1968).
wilkerson 310

F.

Supp. 572 (19o9).

^^ Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d 564 (1971).

decisions that are similar to the one
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield (Minnesota
reached In S errano are:
2 ®The

90

The California Supreme Court observed that California's

state school funding scheme "Invidiously discriminated

against the poor because It makes the quality of a child's
education a function of the wealth of his parents and

neighbors ." 29

The Court stated that the wide disparities

in spending between the school districts in Los Angeles

were inevitable because of the large differentials in
the taxable wealth of the districts.

It also observed

that the state aid that California provided had been

insufficient in bringing about any real equalization of
expenditure levels.
S

The principle that emerged from the

errano decision was that California's school financing

system must be fiscally neutral.

This means that the

level of spending per pupil must be untied from the wealth
of the school district.

At least forty-five suits that

are similar in nature to Serrano have been filed in

twenty-seven different states, and states that have not
had suits filed are vulnerable to such suits because of
their reliance on property tax revenues for schools.

The lone exception is Hawaii, which has only one school

district for the whole state.
San Antonio (Texas), Robinson v. Cahill (New
In a suit
Jersey^ and" Hollins v. Shof stall (Arizona)
Court of
Supreme
York
New
the
charges,
bringing similar
s
plaintiff
the
rejected
Westchester (a trial court)
District
School
claims in Spano v. Lakeland

Rodriguez

v.

.

.

29 Serrano v. Priest.
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The

S

errano decision is not final, however.

It has been remanded to the trial court for further
adju-

dication.
S

The other decisions that were generated by the

errano decision are not final, either.

The United States

Supreme Court will make the final decision on the questions raised in the Serrano decision and the other school

finance decisions.

On April 17, 1972, the Texas Education

Agency appealed the Rodriguez

v.

directly to the Supreme Court.

San Antonio decision
On June 6, 1972, the

Supreme Court decided to hear the Rodriguez case.

No

decision will be reached until after the October, 1972
session of the Supreme Court begins.
the outcome of the decision.
is affirmed,

No one can predict

If the Rodriguez decision

then the "wealth neutrality principles

established in

S

1 '

errano will be a requirement of all the

state school financing systems.

Many observers of the

Supreme Court feel that the chances of the Rodriguez
decision winning are not good because of the conservative

nature of the Court as now constituted.^

A

negative

decision in the Supreme Court would set the struggle for
equality in educational finance for years to come, but
^°See articles by Paul Dimond and Ferdinand
Schoettle for a thorough examination of the legal implications and ramifications of the Serrano decision and
A Victory of Sorts
(Paul Dimond, " S errano
its progeny.
for Ethics, Not Necessarily for Education," Yale Review
of Law and Social Action February, 1972; and Ferdinand
Schoettle, ''The Equal Protection Clause and Public Education," Columbia Law Review, Vol. 71, December, 1971.
:

,

"

.
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the

S

errano decision and Its progeny have already Induced

many of the states to re-examine their present methods
financing schools due to the confusion over Its

meaning and potential Impact on the various states.
Even with the tentativeness of the decision,

Serrano Is being compared with the Brown

v.

Board of

Education decision, concerning its possible Importance
for school and education finance.

Taking the financial

crisis of schools as a given and the uncertainty

of the

constitutionality of the local property tax that is the

mainstay of most of the states' school financing schemes,
it seems crucial to explore some alternative plans for

state school finance.

The alternative school financing

plans to be examined have been constructed so that they

meet the one requirement established in the Serrano
decision: that "the quality of public education may not
be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the

state as a whole.

Alternative School Financing flans
There have been a number of alternative plans

proposed as possible legislative remedies to the wealth

discrimination struck down in Serrano

.

The alternatives

to be explored fall into four categories:

•^Coons, Clune and Sugarman, Private Wealth
p•

x

,
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I.

II.
III.
IV.

Pull State Support Plans;
Mixed State and Local Support Plans;
Federal Support plans;
Cross plan Alternatives. 32

Before the alternative plans are explored in more detail,
the criteria which will be used to evaluate the different

plans will be described.

Criteria for Evaluation
The criteria which will be used to evaluate the

alternative school finance plans fall into four general
categories:
(3)

(1)

legal criteria; (2) financial criteria;

political criteria;

(4)

educational criteria.

The

criteria were designed by the author to cover the important issues that must be dealt with in constructing a

new school finance system in a state.

The four criteria

will be applied to the alternative school finance plans

described in this chapter, and the evaluations will be
the basis of a recommendation as to the best method for

constructing a state school finance system.

The legal and

economic criteria were developed to satisfy the wealth

neutrality principle established in the

S

errano decision.

The political criteria were structured so that they would

reflect the political questions that must be considered
before a new school finance system can be constructed.
32 See John Coons, "School Taxes and Spending
Systems Valid Under Serrano v. Priest ," Lawyers Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, December, 1971.
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i’he

educational criteria were designed to deal with

the crucial questions relating the quality of educational

opportunity to school finance.^-5
The first criterion is that a state's school

finance plan must satisfy the fiscal neutrality principle

established in the

3

errano decision and reaffirmed in

decisions in Minnesota, Texas, New Jersey and Arizona.
This means that variations in the ability of local school

districts to support education must be greatly reduced
or eliminated altogether by the states.

The establish-

ment of wealth neutrality as a principle for state school

finance has not been settled finally in the courts, but
it has generally been accepted as the minimum requirement

for any new state school financing system.
A second criterion that is complimentary with

the first is that a state school financing scheme should

equalize the tax burden and as it equalizes the district's

revenue-raising capabilities.

Although the

3

errano

decision and its progeny did not speak directly to the
question of equalization of the tax burden, it is

desirable objective.

a

highly

The first two criteria are more

objective while the last two (the political and educational
criteria) tend to be more subjective in nature.
on criteria for
evaluating state school financing plans, see National
231-263 and Joh
Educ ational Finance Project Vol. V, pp.
^ucational
Silard, "Legislative Options for Achieving
the La ye
Equalization," unpublished paper prepared for
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.

^For further information
,
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The third criterion to be used in the evaluation
of the alternative school financing plans
is the political

acceptability of the different proposals.
significant aspects of this criterion.

.

There are two

The first is the

issue of local control of public schools.

The local sur

tax option will be at the heart of this debate over local

control .

The issue of local con tro 1 wi 11 also be used as

a red shirt by those who wish to protect the economic

advantage of taxpayers and students in wealthier districts.
The second aspect of the political acceptability criterion

relates to the question of the cost of the finance plan.
If any significant equalization of educational spending
is to take place,

it will come at the expense of the high-

wealth suburban districts which will have increased their
present rates of taxation and receive less or no state
support.

The suburbs generally have the political clout

in the legislature to make or break any of the school

finance plans.

It is very unlikely that any state will

initiate a new school financing program that calls for
a significant Increase in the total cost of education for

the state.

Politics of implementation is not as simple

as rich districts vs. poor districts.

Large numbers of

wealthy people live in poor districts, and conversely,
large numbers of poor people live in rich districts.

Political representation is often cross district, and

i
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legislators represent more than one district.

It is hard

to believe that upper and middle class people living
in

low-wealth and middle-wealth districts will desert public
schools that they have historically supported.

The rich

and near rich who live in high-wealth districts already

oppose equalization.

If these families desert public

education, as many have already, then not much will be
lost.

Sources of support will come from self-interested
school districts below or near the median wealth of the
state.

These districts can expect to benefit by success-

ful reform of state school financing systems.

Another

important source of political support may come from owners
of industrial and commerical property in school districts

with low wealth.

It is questionable whether an alliance

can be formed between residents and businessmen of poor

districts.

The political acceptability of the models

will be the crucial factor in determining the type of

legislation that emerges to remedy the present inequities
in the states'

school financing systems.

The final criterion is that equal educational

opportunity should bp facilitated by the models.

The

term "equal educational opportunity," for the purpose of
this study, means that the variations in educational

needs of the students must be met through the allocations
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of funds.

i'he

funds should be distributed so as to pro-

vide low-expenditure districts (low taxable wealth
districts)

with the means to improve the quality of their
educational offering.

This criterion is the hardest to satisfy,

but it should, in the opinion of the author, be the
central

focus of any new school finance legislation that is drafted.
I.

Plan IA

-

Full State Support Plans

Flat Grant Model
Each school district would receive the same

amount of money ('x

1

by the legislature.

amount) per pupil to be determined

The flat grant would be set at the

eightieth percentile of per pupil expenditure for the
state.

The decision as to how the money would be spent

remains with the local district.

The revenue would be

raised by a uniform statewide property tax.

Evaluation of Plan IA
The state will provide an equal flat grant per

pupil to all school districts.

The cost of education

would be untied from local wealth by providing all school

districts the same amount of revenue per child.

The uni-

form statewide property tax would be an improvement over
the present method of raising school revenue.

It would

also equalize the tax burden by setting a standard rate
that all people would pay, but the state property tax,

unfortunately, retains the same regressive features of
any property tax.

^
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A flat grant financing plan for schools would

not be politically acceptable.

No sur tax option exists

to allow the local school districts to augment the spending

level provided by the flat grant.

If the flat grant were

set at the eightieth percentile of per pupil expenditure
for the state, It would mean that the top twenty per cent
in per pupil expenditures would be leveled off to the

eightieth percentile.

To raise all school districts that

are below the eightieth percentile up to that level would

require an increase of $3.7 billion In state spending for
education with a resulting increase in taxes

.

The hlgh-

expendlture school districts generally have lower property
tax rates than do the low-expenditure districts which

generally have to tax at higher tax rates to try to
achieve anything near spending parity with the high
wealth districts. ^5

The very school districts which

would be expected to pay higher taxes would have just

suffered a cut in their level of spending per pupil.
The wealthy school districts would certainly not support

such a system for financing schools.

The political stance of the urban school dis-

tricts on such a plan is hard to predict.

Many urban

3^See Appendix 0 for the estimated cost of
equalizing school expenditures at the eightieth percentile per pupil and at various other levels by state.
35weiss, Public Schools

,

p.

20.
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school districts spend as much or more than many suburban
school districts.

A number of urban school districts

could be affected adversely by such a plan in terms of
their expenditure levels per pupil. 36
the affect is Just as questionable.

On the tax side,
In three quarters of

the large urban centers, a full state assumption of school

costs would mean increased taxes.

Major urban cities in

1967 had higher market value of property per pupil than

any other type of school district, including the sururbs.^7
It is conceivable that a number of urban centers would

have increased taxes, but they would be receiving less

There might be a decrease in

money per pupil to spend.

the school tax rates for some of the urban school districts,

but most others would be increased.

The political possibility of passing

a flat

grant system of financing schools is practically nil.
The wealthy suburban school districts'

opposition to such

a plan is insured by the very real possibility of their

having their taxes increased and their expenditure
levels decreased.

The support of urban school districts

for full state assumption is questionable at best.

The

36fjearly twice as many central cities would
receive lower expenditures from the state under a statereceive.
wide distribution of funds than they presently
66.
Aspects
p.
Berke and Kelley, Financial

See

,

37johns, et. al

.

,

Alternatives

,

p.

91.
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districts rh$t stand to benefit from such a plan through

increased spending and lower tax rates do not have the
political powe- to pass such a plan in the legislature.
If a flat grant was instituted by a state at

the eightieth percentile for per pupil expenditures, it

would provide increased revenue for many districts.

This

would allow these districts the option of increasing

teacher salaries, reducing class size, hiring new personnel,

instituting new programs, improving the school facilities,
etc.

Unfortunately, increased expenditures have not

effectively demonstrated that increased expenditures per
pupil can improve the quality of the educational perforThe flat grant model does not

mance of the students.

take into account different types of students and their

different types of educational needs.

Even with the

questionableness of the impact of extra dollars on improving the quality of education, the poor school districts
should have the right to make mistakes with the money.

John Coons, senior author of Private Wealth and Public

Education stated:
If money is Inadequate to improve educations,
the residents of poor districts should at
east have an equal Opportunity to be disappointed by its failure. 3o

38j 0 hn Coons is quoted in "Who Pays the Bills?"
Time, February 7, 1972 p. 52
,

.

—

:

•

101

—

n l? “ Flat Grant plus Cost Differentials

The state would provide each school district

with equal flat grants per pupil set at the
eightieth

percentile with the addition of categorical aid for
cost
differentials.

The cost differentials might include

transportation costs, cost of living differences, and

municipal overburden factor.

a

The school districts would

retain the right to decide how the money would be allocated.

The tax revenue would be raised by a uniform state-

wide property tax. 39

Evaluation of Plan IB
The state will provide an equal flat grant per

pupil to all school districts with the addition of cate-

gorical aid for transportation costs, cost of living
differentials, and for municipal overburden.

The cost

of education would be untied from local wealth by provi-

ding all school districts with the same amount of revenue
per child.

The uniform statewide property tax would be

an improvement over the present method of raising school

revenue.

It would also equalize the tax burden by setting

a standard rate that all people would pay,

but the state-

wide property tax retains the same regressive features
of any property tax.
39s ee Who Should Pay for Public Schools
Advisory commission on Intergovern(Washington, D.C.
mental Relations, 1971)
,
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A flat grant with the addition of categorical

aid would not be politically acceptable.

No sur tax option

exists to allow the local school districts to augment

their spending level provided by the flat grant and cate-

gorical aid.

If the flat grant level were set at the

eightieth percentile of per pupil expenditure for the
state, it would mean that the top twenty per cent in per

pupil expenditures would be leveled off to the eightieth
percentile.

To raise all the districts below the eightieth

percentile up to that level would require a significant
increase in state spending for education with a resulting

increase in taxes.

The big expenditure districts generally

have lower property tax rates than do the low expenditure

districts which generally have to tax at higher tax rates
to try to achieve anything near spending parity with the

high wealth school districts.

^

The very districts which

would be expected to pay higher taxes would have Just

suffered a cut in their level of spending per pupil.
The wealthy districts would certainly not support such a
system of financing schools.

The political stance of the urban school districts on such a plan is hard to project.

Many urban

school districts spend as much or more than many suburban

^°See Footnote 3^.

^See

Footnote 35.
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school districts.

So a number of urban school districts

could be affected adversely by such a plan in terms
of
their expenditure levels per pupil. 42
the affect is just as questionable.

On the tax side,
Major urban core

cities in 1967 had higher market value of property per

pupil than any other type of school district, Including
the suburbs. 4 5

There might be a decrease in the school

tax rates for some of the urban school districts while

others may be increased.

A municipal overburden factor

would make the plan more attractive to urban centers, but
just how much would be determined by the size of the

factor.
The political possibility of passing a flat

grant system of financing schools (even with the addition
of categorical aid) is not good.

The wealthy suburban

school districts' opposition to such a plan is insured
by the very real possibility of having taxes increased

and expenditure levels decreased.

The support of urban

school districts is questionable at best, but the muni-

cipal overburden would make the distribution side of the
plan more attractive.

The districts that stand to bene-

fit from such a plan through increased spending and lower
tax rates do not have the political power to pass such
a plan in the legislature.

42 See Footnote 36.
4 3see Footnote 37.
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If a flat grant was Instituted by a state at
the eightieth percentile for per pupil expenditures In
the state, It would provide Increased revenue for many

districts.

This would allow these districts the option

of Increasing teacher salaries, reducing class size,

hiring new personnel, instituting new programs, improving
the school facilities, etc.

Increased expenditures have

yet to demonstrate that the extra money can improve the

quality of the educational performance of the students.
The flat grant model does not take into account different

types of students and their different types of educational
needs.

Even with the questionableness of the impact of

extra spending on improving the quality of education,

poor school districts should have the right to be dis-

appointed by the failure of increased spending to improve
the educational quality.

Plan IC

-

Plat Grant with Cost Differentials plus
Dollar preferences for Educating Different
Types of Students
Each school district would receive a flat

grant per pupil plus categorical aid as in Model IB.

Weighting as to cost differentials of educating different
types of students would be taken into account in this

model.

See Table 2

.

Each school district would retain

local control over curriculum and personnel decisions.
of a uniform
The state would raise the revenue by the use

statewide property tax.

The local districts would not
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be allowed to supplement per pupil expenditure levels

supplied by the state.
TABLE 2

STUDENT WEIGHTING INDEX

Educational Program
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Basic elementary grades 1-6
Grades 7-9
Grades 10-12
Physidally handicapped
Compensatory education
Vocational education

Source:

Weighting
1.00
1.20
1.40
3.25
2.00
1.80

Johns, et. al .~ Alternative Programs for Financing Schools Vol. V, 1971, p. 269.
,

Evaluation of Plan IC
The state will provide an equal flat grant per
pupil with cost differentials to all school districts with
the addition of dollar preferences for educating students

with different educational needs.

The cost of education

would be untied from local wealth by providing all school

districts the same amount of revenue per child.

The

uniform statewide property tax would be an improvement
over the present method of raising school revenue.

It

would also equalize the tax burden by setting a standard
rate that all people would pay, but the statewide property
property
tax retains the same regressive features of any
tax.
and stuA flat grant with the categorical aid
be politically
dent preference weighting would not likely

.
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acceptable.

No sur tax option exists to allow the local

school districts to augment their spending level provided
by the flat grant or the additional and provided by the
state.

If the flat grant level were set at the eightieth

percentile of per pupil expenditure for the state, it
would mean that the top twenty per cent in per pupil

expenditures would be leveled off to the eightieth percentile.

To raise all the districts below the eightieth

percentile to that level would require

a

significant

increase in state spending for education with a resulting
increase in taxes.

^

The high-expenditure districts

generally have lower property tax rates than do the lowexpenditure districts that generally have to tax at
higher tax rates to try to achieve anything near spending

parity with the high wealth school districts.

The

very districts that would have had their taxes increased
would have just suffered a cut in the level of spending
per pupil in their district.

The wealthy districts

would certainly not support such a system of financing

schools
The political stance of the urban school districts on such a plan is hard to project.

Many urban

school districts spend as much or more than many suburban
school districts.

So a number of urban school districts

^See Footnote

34.

^^See Footnote 35.

^
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could be affected adversely by such
a plan In terras of
their expenditure levels per pupil. ^6
on the tax side,
the affect is Just as questionable.

A large number of

the largest school districts in urban areas
would be

forced to raise taxes if this plan were instituted.

Major urban core cities in 1967 had higher market
value
of property per pupil than any other type of
school dis-

trict, including the suburbs

.

There might be

a

decrease

in the school tax rates for some of the urban school
dis-

tricts while others may be increased, and the affect on

per pupil expenditures is Just as questionable.

The political possibility of passing a flat

grant system of financing would be improved by the addition of the spending according to weighted students.

The wealthy suburban school districts' opposition to
such a plan is insured by the very real possibility of

having taxes increase and expenditure levels decrease.

Though the urban districts stand to gain more than the
suburban districts because of the student weighting,
their political support would be tentative based on the
level of student weighting.

If the municipal overburden

factor was adequate in the categorical aid, this would be

another political plus as far as urban districts are
^6$ee pootnote 36.
^7see Footnote 37.
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concerned.

j'he

districts that stand to benefit from

such a plan through increased spending and lower tax

rates do not have the political power to pass such a
plan in the legislature, but the flat grant with the

addition of student dollar preferences would stand

a

better chance than the other flat grant plans.
If a flat grant was instituted by a state at
the eightieth percentile for per pupil expenditures in
the state, it would provide increased revenue for many

districts.

This would allow these districts the option

of increasing teacher salaries,

reducing class size,

hiring new personnel, instituting new programs, improving
the school facilities,

etc.

Unfortunately, Increased

expenditures have yet to demonstrate that the extra money
can improve the quality of educational performance of
the students.

The flat grant model with the addition of

student weighting does take into account the (educational
needs) different types of students.

Even with the ques-

tionableness of the Impact of extra dollars on improving
the quality of education,

the poor school districts

should have the right to be disappointed by its failure
to Increase the quality of education for its students.
i’he

allocation of school revenue on the basis

educational
of weighted students would be a significant
flat
Improvement over the straight flat grant plan or the

grant plan with categorical aid.

It would not likely
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increase the political attractiveness of
the flat grant
plan enough to make it a real political
possibility,
xhe New York State Commission on the
Quality, Cost and

Financing of elementary and Secondary Education
has
recommended a similar plan with some modifications. 48
The reaction to the Commission's plan has been cool in
the legislature, and chances for passage in its recommended form seem very small.

II.

Plan IIA

-

Mixed State and Local Support Plans

District Power Equalized Plan
The tax ability of each district within the

state would be equalized at any given tax rate option.
The districts could then choose at what tax rate they

wanted to place themselves and thus decide the amount
of money spent on each pupil.

If a district did not

raise the designated amount of money at the given rate,
the state would provide the extra money to raise it to
the stipulated level.

If a school district raised more

money than the stipulated amount, then the extra money
would be given to the state to redistribute to communities

with lower tax bases.

See i'able 3.

The local school

districts would keep the right to decide its tax rate
48 Report of the New York State Commission on
the Quality. Cost~and Fina ncing of Elementary and Secondary Education^ Vol. I, 19Y2.
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and expenditure per pupil on the basis of the chart
in

Table
b,y

3.

The ability to raise money has to be equalized

the state.

All other school districts* functions

would remain the same.
TABLE

3

DISTRICT POWER-EQUALIZING
Expenditure
Per Pupil

Tax Rate
2

mills per $100 assessed valuation

2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
Note:

"
"

"
"

"
"
"

$600
$700
$800
$900
1,000
$
$1,100
$ 1,200
$1,300

This chart was designed by the author for illustrative purposes only.
It was not intended for actual
implementation.

Evaluation of Plan IIA
A district power equalized model would meet

the wealth neutrality test by equalizing the ability of
each school district within a state to raise tax revenue.

The tax rate for any chosen level of spending would be
equalized.

If District A chose to spend at $900 per

pupil, it would tax at the 3.5 mills per $100.

The same

would hold true for any other district choosing the $900
per pupil expenditure level.

The local district would be

allowed to chcose its level of spending per pupil.

It

below
would be at or above a state set minimum and at or

Ill

a state set maximum.

By choosing the expenditure level,

the school district determines Its school tax
rate.

This aspect of the district power equalizing
plan serves
the same function as the local sur tax option,
but the

plan has a strong political weakness.
This weakness results from the revenue recapture feature which affects the wealthy districts.

Assume

that District A chooses to spend $1,300 per pupil at a
tax rate of 5.5 mills per $100 assessed valuation.

If

the district actually raised $2,000 at that tax rate, it

would be obliged to surrender the $700 per pupil that it

collected over the $1,300 figure to the state for redis-

tribution to districts that do not raise enough revenue
at their chosen tax rate. ^9

The reason for the minimum expenditure level
is to protect against districts that will not choose to

spend an adequate amount of money on education.

The

maximum rate is necessary to protect the state's budget. 5°
If no limit were set,

the poor districts might choose

high levels of spending and taxation while they would not
4 ?A possible implication may be that district

power-equalizing for school finance might enable some rich
"unburdened" districts to Join the others in not being
able to tax for schools in accord with their "real" preferences and would free some poor districts to express
a preference in the rate of their school tax.
50jj

ew York Qommlsslon, p. 2.45.
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raise the needed money which the state would be
required
to supply.

Therefore, the state would have to make up

the difference and run the risk of a huge deficit if
a

maximum expenditure level were not set.

In all likelihood,

there would be a significant increase in state expenditures because the maximum would have to be set at a
level near the top percentile of expenditures for the
state.

This would allow property-poor school districts

to increase their expenditures while keeping their tax

rates the same or by decreasing them.

The possibility

of a district power equalized system of school financing

passing in a state legislature is small.

The revenue

recapture feature would make the plan politically unacceptable to wealthy districts.

The real possibility of

significant increases in state education expenditures is
another political liability.

The district power equali-

zation plan has the refinements of categorical aid and

student weighting.

These features would improve the

plan, but it is not enough to make it politically accep-

table.

^
Educationally, a district power equalizing plan

would provide poor school districts the chance to spend

additional money on education, assuming that they could
5l3ee Coons, Clune and Sugarman, Private Wealth
politics of a power
pp, 273-283, for an analysis of the
equalized system.

,
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maintain their present high tax rates.
them a chance to raise teachers'

hire new personnel, etc.

JL'his

would give

salaries, cut class size,

but this plan, in reality, only

,

equalizes dollars rather than Improve education or learning.

Poor districts should have as much to spend on education
as wealthy districts,

but the quality of a child's educa-

tion should no more be the function of his neighbor's

value of education than of his wealth.

Plan IIB

Flat Grant Plus a Limited Local Sur Tax Option

-

The state would provide a flat grant per pupil,
and it would also allow each district to raise an addi-

tional amount of money from local tax revenue.

The add-

on would have to be power equalized for this model to be

constitutional under the

S

errano decision, but a signi-

ficant narrowing of the spending differential might be

acceptable

to

the court.

State revenue would be raised

by a uniform statewide property tax.

Evaluation of Plan IIB
A fiat grant with a power equalized local

sur tax option allowed at the local level would untie

the cost of education from local wealth.

The tax burden

would be equalized because the tax rate would be uniform
for all,

but the statewide property tax retains the

regressive feature of any property tax.
The plan's political acceptability is enhanced

greatly by the addition of the local sur tax option.
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ihe sur tax option,

even when power equalized, provides

wealthier communities a better opportunity
to supplement
school spending because of the favored economic

position.

Even facing the possibility of a higher property
tax
rate,

the wealthier community will be more likely to
use

the sur tax option.

Cities faced with a heavy municipal

overburden factor will have a much harder time raising
extra tax revenue through a sur tax option because of their

already strained tax rates. 52

This same phenomena can

be expected to hold true for poor school districts,

too.

If this plan were instituted and funded at the

eightieth percentile, it would take a significant increase
in state spending and,

thus, state taxes to provide the

additional #3*7 billion necessary to bring all those
school districts below the eightieth percentile mark up

52"Michelson and Grubb have begun to undertake
this task by examining the interrelationship among many
variables including school tax rates, non-education tax
rates, local school revenue per pupil, local revenue for
non-education purposes, property valuation, state school
aid, federal school aid, mean faculty income, average
daily attendance, children from low income families and
population.
Their work suggests many interesting interrelationships, causes and effects. One of their most
interesting conclusions is that 'non-educational spending
is, by and large, determined by factors beyond the control^
of communities, and tends not to be subject to discretion.'
Educational spending, on the other hand, is more constrained
The school tax
by the availability of fiscal resources.
are
requirements
rate will be lowered if non-educational
non-education
high in burdened communities, while the
rate is not similarly affected by a high school tax rate."
Excerpt from Paul Eimond, ''Serrano: A Victory of Sorts for
Ethics, Not Necessarily for Education," Yale Review of
Law and Social Action, Vol. II, No. 2, Winter 1971, p. 1^0.
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to it across the nation.

This would detract from its

political acceptability, but in general, this plan, with
any of the modifications from Plan

I

(Categorical Aid

and Student Weighting) is the best political possibility,
ihis is so because it is the plan that resembles the

present way most states are financing schools.

It offers

the wealthy districts the opportunity to supplement the

flat grants through a local sur tax add on.
The quality of the educational offering could

possibly be raised because of the increased revenue

most districts would be receiving.

Districts that were

receiving extra dollars could Increase teacher salaries,
cut class size, hire new personnel, institute new prog-

rams,

The plan could be designed to include cate-

etc.

gorical aid and student weighting which would increase its

attractiveness both politically and educationally.

Given

the questionableness of the impact of extra dollars on
the quality of education,

granted the right

to

the poor districts should be

spend equal amounts of money per

pupil as the wealthy districts do, no matter what the

affect of the additional spending.
III.

Plan III A

-

Federal Support Models

Federal Revenue Sharing^

Federal revenue is distributed to the states
53xhis plan was taken from the National Educational Finance Project, Vol. V, p. 209
.
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on the basis of population with the requirement
that
a fixed

percentage (40 per cent) of those funds be allo-

cated to public education.

If the federal revenue to be

shared were set at 018 billion with a minimum of 40 per
cent being allocated for education, then 07.2 billion, or

approximately 20 per cent of the present level of state
and local expenditures, would be allocated by the states

for education.

Evaluation of plan IIIA
A federal revenue sharing plan by itself would

not satisfy the wealth neutrality principle established
in the S errano decision unless it was designed to replace

the local share of public school support.

For a federal

revenue sharing plan to do this, it would take over 018
billion or 100 per cent of the stipulated federal revenue
to be shared. 5^

if the revenue provided by the federal

government did replace the revenue supplied by the local

property tax, it would significantly equalize the tax
burden on the local taxpayer.

The federal tax structure

is more progressive than either the state or local tax

structures which tend to be more regressive. 55
A federal revenue sharing plan could have no

revenue sharing plan to be effective,
22 to 30 per cent of the revenue
between
supply
it should
Alternatives Vol . V»
et. al
Johns,
schools.
for public
208-209.
pp.
54j?or a

.

5 5 ibid.

,

pp.

193-229.

,

,
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Impact on the sur tax option which is a state
responsibility.

A revenue sharing plan similar to this one seems

to have a

chance of passing Congress this year.

The states

are likely to welcome whatever tax relief this would
bring

since local expenses have increased twelvefold from
$11

billion to over $132 billion in the past twenty-five
years, while federal expenses have climbed at less than

one-third of that rate. 56
Federal revenue sharing, if it simply turned
$7.2 billion or $18 billion over to the states for distri-

bution with no requirement for changes in the present

method states finance schools and distribute revenue
to schools, would bring about little equalization.

The

design of the revenue sharing plan and the requirements
for change of the present systems of financing schools

will determine the equalization of expenditures.

Another

way for the federal government to improve the fiscal

position of the states for supporting public schools
would be to remove welfare costs from the state.

ing to the Flelschman Commission Report

,

Accord-

Bill HR1, which

is pending in Congress, would pay for about one-thir ti eth
of New York's welfare cost. 57

This would be a supplemen-

tal move, but in itself is not enough to ease the educa-

tional burden of the states.

A complete takeover of welfare

56 Report of the New York State Commission

3.09-3.10.
5^1 bid.

,

p.

3.12.

,

pp.
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by the federal government would be a significant step
in the right direction for federal aid.

The consequences

for the quality of education are hard to predict given
the numerous ways of designing the federal revenue

sharing plan. 5$

flan IIIB

-

National Foundation Plan

A

national foundation level would be established

which the state and federal governments would guarantee
to

every school district on a per pupil basis.

The

federal government would provide $12 billion of the support
and the state governments would provide the rest of the

money to support public education. 59

The federal revenue

would be raised by a value-added tax.

The plan would be

designed to encourage states to adopt some form of

a

full state funding plan to finance schools.

Evaluation of Plan IIIB
A national foundation program supported by the

federal and state governments would satisfy the wealth

neutrality test by removing the local districts' wealth
as a factor in the support of public education.

Relief

from the local property tax would help equalize the tax
burden, but if the federal support came from a value-

added tax (a form of a national sales tax), it would
58johns,
208 - 209

et.

al.

Alternatives

,

.

59see Footnote 46

.

,

Vol. V, pp.
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merely mean a switch from one regressive tax to another. 60
If federal funds were provided out of Income tax revenues,
a

significant equalization of tax burden would take place.

Spending would be equalized for all districts within
each state.
Ihe question of local control of schools would
be at the heart of the political debate on this plan.

The increased federal support and loss of local support
of schools would indicate a sharp decline in local control.

There would be no sur tax option under this plan, but
one could be added without much difficulty as long as
it were power equalized.

The states would have to have

the opportunity to increase their share of support for

education relative to the federal support to satisfy the
high expenditure states.

Assuming that this condition is

met, the states would have to set their level of support
at a high enough level to satisfy the wealthy districts

within the states.

This could mean a significant increase

in state aid with a resultant increase in state taxes

which would be politically unacceptable.

If,

In fact,

the state did accept this plan and set a high level of

per pupil support, the low wealth districts would have an
6°Franlc Fowlkes, "Administration Leans to Valueonal
Added Tax to Help Solve National Fiscal Crisis, Natl
Impact
of
analysis.
Journal, February 5, 1972. For a good
of the value-added tax, see pp. 210-219.
:
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increase in revenue to support their schools.

This would

allow a number of districts below the established foundation level the option of spending increased revenue on

Increased teacher salaries, cutting the class size,
hiring new personnel, instituting new programs, etc.
f he

national foundation plan was not designed to allocate

revenue on the basis of student weighting, but this adaptation could be included at the state level.

Plan IIIC

-

The National .Education Trust^l

A

National Education Trust would be created to

finance portions of education at all levels

-

pre-school,

elementary and secondary education, college, adult education, and manpower retraining.

The fund would pay for

the direct cost of schooling (tuition, books, etc.), but

not school construction.

i’he

people who received the

benefit of support for their education from the National

Education Trust would have to replenish the fund through
an income tax surcharge.

The surcharge would vary in

its rate, depending on the income on a progressive scale.

The costs of schooling would be repaid over a person's

working years.

The National Education Trust would provide

ninety per cent of the support of pre-school education,
6^This plan was designed by Governor Milton
Shapp and his staff in Pennsylvania, and it was presented
at
at the N.E.S.D.E.C. Conference on School Finance
Harvard University on January 8, 1972.

^

•
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fifty per cent of the support for elementary
and secon-

dary education (the rest coining from the state),
and

ninety per cent of the college costs.

It would also

provide more lor adult education and manpower retraining.
It is assumed that state support of education will
con-

tinue at the present level with federal revenues replacing

those previously provided locally.

Evaluation of flan IIIC
A National Education Trust would meet the

wealth neutrality principle established in the Serrano
decision.

By providing federal revenue instead of local

revenue for the support of the public education, the
cost of education would be effectively removed from the
local level.

The Trust would supply fifty per cent of

the cost of elementary and secondary education by absor-

bing the local district's financial responsibilities and
the state would provide the other half of the revenue for

public schools at the elementary and secondary level.
The tax burden would be equalized significantly since the

federal funds would come from a progressive income tax
surcharge, and the state tax source would be more equitable than the present local property tax system.

The

state's share of expenses would rise slightly, from
41 per cent to 50 per cent on the average,
6

Digest 1970

,

p

.

51

but probably
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not enough to make the plan politically unacceptable

because of Increased expenses.

The Congressional poli-

tics involved in the passage of the National Education

Trust are very hard to predict because of the newness
of the proposal.

The issue of local control of education would
be at the heart of the debate over the National Education

Trust.

A system would have to be designed that allowed

policy decision-making for the school districts to continue at the local level while the financing of the

schools was handled at the state and national levels.

There is no sur tax option available for local school
districts to supplement school expenditures.

The rela-

tionship between the state's and the federal government's

role in education would certainly be a key issue as far
as the states are concerned.

The Trust would have to

be designed to allow local decision making to continue

and to allow the state's role in education to be solidi-

fied before it would be politically acceptable at these
levels.

Per pupil expenditures would be equalized
with poor districts receiving additional revenue to
spend.

Poor districts could use the additional revenue

they received to increase teacher salaries, cut class
size, hire new personnel, add new programs, etc.

Whether

.
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or not the additional per pupil expenditures will
improve

the quality of education for students in poor districts
is

certainly debatable, but poor districts should have

the same right to experience the potential disappointment

of increased expenditures as the wealthy districts do.
IV.

Plan IVA

-

Cross Model Alternatives

Educational Vouchers^
The family would receive an educational voucher

for the full cost of each child's education.

Schools

could neither charge extra tuition nor receive private
grants or gifts.

Underachievers would be given additional

money for their education.

Admission

to

schools would be

handled by random selection of all the applicants so
that schools could not selectively exclude or include

certain groups of students.

A

voucher plan could be

financed by any of the plans described in Plans

I

-III.

Evaluation of Plan IVA
An educational voucher system could be financed
by any of the methods described in the proceeding plans

(I-III).

a voucher system would provide each student

with an equal grant (or it could be constructed on

a

weighted student basis) which would satisfy the Serrano
Educational
al
et
Education
ing
Financ
on
rt
Repo
Vouchers: A Preliminary
the Study
r
CenterTor
(Harvard:
TTv~ Pa v ments to Parents
of Public Policy, 1 $?(5

^Christopher Jencks,

:

,

)

.

.

,
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wealth neutrality principle by utilizing
the cost of
education from local wealth. The extent of

tax burden

equalization would depend on the tax plan that was
adopted

to

supply revenue for the voucher system.
An educational voucher plan is not likely to be

politically acceptable for a number of reasons.

No sur

tax add on would be allowed (in this case, no family

supplementation would be allowed).

If families were

allowed to add on extra dollars to the voucher grant,
then the cost of education would be truly related to
wealth.

Vouchers could only be used in public schools
and private schools that agreed to accept the voucher
as tuition while making no other charges for the cost
of a child's

question.

education.

Religious schools pose

a tough

If they agreed to accept any student that

applied and did not charge extra tuition, would they be

allowed to participate?
question at this time.

Only the courts can answer that
As for private schools that

charged in excess of the voucher, they would exist as
private schools do today with no state support.
A number of interest groups would oppose the

implementation of an educational voucher system on
large scale.

a

Teachers’ unions and administrators' organi

zations would certainly resist any plan that allowed the

creation of large numbers of alternative schools.

Any

^

,
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real threat to the Jobs of these groups would surely

result In their attempt to block such a plan.
A

voucher plan that provided for open enroll-

ment and random selection of students In urban and suburban areas would pose a possible threat to
of segregation in the North.

the patterns

Thus, a voucher plan can

be expected to draw strong opposition from the white

majority if the segregated school patterns are really
threatened.

If a voucher plan were implemented, it

might cause an exodus of white students to private
schools, if real integration seemed possible.

Thus,

there are a number of strong political reasons why an

educational voucher system is very unlikely to be politically acceptable on a large scale.

Three school districts

have completed feasibility studies on the possibility
of Implementing an educational voucher system (Seattle,

Alum Rock, California and San Francisco)

,

but none of

the school districts have actually initiated a voucher
plan, and none of them are considering the use of vouchers
on a large scale.
A

voucher system could be designed to provide

money according
basis).

to

student needs

(

on a weighted student

If extra money was provided to underacheivers

^"Voucher plan May Be Tested," New
January 10, 1972,

p.

E^.

Yor k Times,

;
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It might encourage schools to compete Tor underachl
evers

because of the extra money incentive, and hopefully, use
the extra money to try to Improve the program.

A

voucher

plan would encourage the development of a number of alter-

native schools which might improve the quality of education for poor districts.

If student selection was done

on a random basis, it would provide the opportunity for

the mixing of social classes and the races in schools

which could Improve educational opportunities for the poor
and minority students.

Plan IVB

School District Reorganization

-

A

school district reorganization plan might

call for the following:

(1)

consolidation of small,

high cost districts; (2) regionalization of high cost

educational services (i.e. vocational education, transportation, data processing and other special services)
(3)

metropoli tani zing school districts to equalize the

tax bases of the districts.

A

school district reorgani-

zation plan could be financed by any of the methods

described in plans I-III.

Evaluation of Plan IVB
A

school district reorganization plan that

created school districts with approximately equal assessed

valuations per pupil would probably satisfy the wealth

neutrality principle established in the

^

errano decision.

This affect could be accomplished by consolidation

oi
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small districts, regionalization of other districts, or
m

e

tropolitanlzation of urban school districts depending

on the geography, population and wealth of the different

areas.

Different types of school organization could also

be funded by any of the methods described in Plans

1-m.

The amount of tax burden equalization would depend on
the method of taxation that was used.

The political acceptability of any of the school

district reorganization plans will be a hard problem.

Consolidating small high cost school districts runs head
on into the issue of local control.

Many inefficient

high cost school districts would rather retain their
local control over education than garner the economic
and educational benefits of consolidation.

The two most

obvious benefits are the lower cost of the school program
and the ability of a larger school district to offer a

wider variety of education programs for the children.
As a historical trend,

school district consolidation has

been occurring rapidly without much encouragement irom
the states.

In 1948, there were 95,000 school districts,

and by 1970,

there were only 18,000 in the United States,

but there are still far too many high cost districts

that need consolidating. ^5

65Little is known about the relationship oi
and
state aid distribution and district organization,
to
districts
few states are doing anything to encourage
103Alternatives pp.
See Johns, et. al
reorgani ze
.

.

,

,

3
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A

metropolitan school district that was designed

to erase the suburban tax privileges and

equalize the

tax base will run into opposition for two key reasons.

The first is financial.

The suburbs are not likely to

give up the very tax and educational privileges they

have had for so long without a hard political struggle.
The second reason is that a metropolitan school district

would create the strong possibility of school integration

after the many gerrymandered school district lines were
redrawn.

It has been effectively demonstrated in Detroit,

Michigan and Richmond, Virginia, that any district reorganization to achieve integration must include the suburbs. 66
The bussing issue has gone a long way in creating more

division in this country, and any metropolitan plan will
The likelihood of

certainly involve the bussing issue.

any metropolitan school district emerging in the United

States is very unlikely without a court order, and the

possibility of a federal district court order

to

consoli-

date schools for integration is not likely to be upheld
in the Supreme Court.

66 See Bradley v. Mllllken
F. Supp.
Board of
School
City
v.
Bradley
and
October 4, 1971
Tor in10\
197?,
January
F. Supp.
Richmond,
the
involving
integration
formation on court-ordered
1972,
June
On
7»
districts.
surrounding suburban school
district
federal
the
the U.S. Court of Appeals overturned
court order for the formation of one large school
districts.
district in Richmond involving the suburban
,

,

n
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An effective school district reorganization
plan has the potential to cut expenses for high cost

districts by consolidating costs for transportation,

vocational education and other specialized services.
School district consolidation of small, inefficient

districts would allow for the expansion of the variety
of school programs that a larger school district can

provide for its students.

A district reorganization

plan that was designed to encourage social and racial

integration would be an important step in the right
direction for improving education, if not qualitatively,
at least humanely.

A district reorganization plan that

was financed by any of the methods in Plans I-III would

have the additional benefits and problems that accrue
from the type of plan used to finance the schools.

Summary
The list of alternative plans for financing

schools that were described and evaluated are by no

means exhaustive.

Many variations of the plans which

added to
were described exist and are available to be

any state's school financing system.

The

S

errano

and
decision and its progeny have served as catalysts,

reevaluate their
many state legislatures have started to
because
present methods of financing schools

decisions.

The principal reaction to the

o

ot

err a

the
o

.
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decision so far has been for the states to create commissions to reexamine present methods used in financing
education.

The exact meaning of the

S

errano decision is

not known, but it is clear that the cost of education

must be untied from wealth of the individual or the local
The Supreme Court will decide the ultimate fate

district.

of the wealth neutrality principle when it hears the

Rodriguez case during its next session in October, 1972.
If the recent school finance decisions are upheld in the

Supreme Court, then an important step will have been
taken in the solution to the school finance crisis.

Joel Berke, a noted school finance expert, observed that the public education fiscal crisis was charac-

terized by:

...

failure to raise adequate revenues through
equitable means, and second, an inability to aliocate revenues in an efficient and equitable manner.
a

,

Before the fiscal crisis facing education will be remedied,
both sides of the crisis will have to be eliminated.

The school finance crisis is not likely to be rectified
quickly, but the recent school finance court decisions

have provided the stimulus necessary to potentially
finance
speed progress in the solution of the school

crisis
6?Berke, "Current Crisis," p.

2.

^

CHAPTER

V

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

After evaluating the various alternative school

financing plans, the author has concluded that

a full-

state funding plan is the best solution to the present

inequities that exist in school finance.

A

full-state

assumption of public school costs would remove school

district wealth as the determining factor in school
spending and would allow the state to determine how
funds were distributed to the districts.

A full-state

funding plan would equalize the tax burden.

A

progressive

income tax would be the most equitable way to raise

money for schools, but the states are not likely to forego
the productive property tax as a source of revenue for

schools.

A uniform statewide property tax is the form

do
of taxation which will emerge in most states that

restructure their school financing systems.
For changes to occur in most state educational

financing systems, a court order will be needed.

State

State,
^The Fleischman Commission in New York
Michigan
in
Arthur Wise in Maryland, Governor Milliken
6
1971)
and California Assembly Bill No. 1406 (April
property taxes
all have recommended uniform statewide
which as
finance education in those states. Hawaii,
ta
full-state funding plan, has a statewide property
,

.
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legislatures have historically demonstrated an unwillingness to create school finance systems that distribute

state aid in a way which equalizes spending disparities

between school districts.

Opposition for any system

that equalizes educational spending can be expected from

high-expenditure districts and most urban districts.
Both types of districts stand to have their expenditure
levels frozen or cut, and both stand to have their school
tax rates increased.

For this reason, the author feels

that only a victory in the U.S. Supreme Court for Rodriguez
v.

San Antonio

2
.

or state constitutional victories similar

to the one in New Jersey, will lead to the reform of

state school financing schemes.
A full-state funding plan would provide low-

expenditure districts with increased revenue to spend on
education.

The questionable impact of increased spending

on educational achievement, demonstrated in the Coleman

Report and other studies, is no excuse not to provide
the increased revenue to poor districts.-^

As John Coons

argued, the poor districts have the same right to be

disappointed by the failure of increased spending on
schools to increase educational achievement as the wealthy

districts are.

To the author, it is as much a matter of

2 Rodrlguez v.

San Antonio 40 Law Week 2398 (1972).

^See Footnote 33 in Chapter I,

p.

24.
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political and social equity as it is of educational equity.
If a society selectively spends less on poor and minority

students'

education than on wealthy students, it clearly

indicates that the society is not committed to mating the
schools an avenue for social and economic advancement.
A full-state funding plan would help remedy the inequities

in spending between districts, and hopefully within districts.

Poor districts could choose a variety of ways
spend their new funds, such as:

to

to Increase teacher

salaries, to reduce the pupil-teacher ratio, to buy new

instructional materials, or to improve facilities.

Whether

increased spending will improve the educational achievement is questionable, but as a question of political and
social equality, equalizing spending per pupil between

districts is an important step.

A full-state funding plan

would be able to remedy the inequalities in spending between
districts.
To remedy per pupil spending disparities between

states will take a significant increase in federal aid.
A full-state funding plan coupled with a federal revenue

sharing plan or federal assumption of welfare costs would
help to equalize spending disparities between states.

Pull-State Funding Reexamined
educational
The concept of full-state funding of
advent of
costs has become common vocabulary since the

j
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the constitutional attacks on Btate school financing

plans.

James Conant Is credited with becoming the first

educator In recent times to advocate full-state assumption
of educational costs.

In 1968, he advocated

full-state

funding with the stipulation that the local school districts
retain their policy-making and personnel functions.^

Conant recommended that the local property tax be completely
eliminated as a financial support for education and in Its
place would be substituted a statewide property tax.

Since Conant made his proposal in 1968, it has
gained support In a number of quarters.

In 1969, the

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, a
bi-partisan intergovernmental agency representing federal,
state and local branches of government, recommended full-

state assumption of "substantially all funding for public

elementary and secondary schools." 5

on the basis of a

statewide task force report on school finance in 1969,

Governor William Milliken of Michigan recommended a constitutional amendment virtually eliminating the use of local

property tax in financing schools and full-state assumption
4stephen Weiss, Existing Disparities in Public
Boston Federal
School Finance and Proposals for Reform
Bo.
Bank,
p.
1970
Reserve
,

(

:

,

^Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, State Aid to Local Governments Washington,
,

D.C., 1969, p. I.

9
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of the costs of education. 6

Legislation was proposed

in California, before the S errano decision had
been

reached, which advocated state assumption of most of
the

school costs financed by a uniform statewide property
tax

with a limited local sur tax option. 7

in i a te 1971,

the Fleischman Commission in New York State recommended

full-state assumption of schools and the Imposition of

a

uniform statewide property tax after an extensive study. 6
In March of 1972, the President's Task Force on School

Finance called for state governments to assume the current
costs of local support for education over a five-year
period.

There appears to be widely-based support for

full-state assumption of public educational costs.

With

the added inducement of a possible constitutional mandate

for school financing reform, why are the states not adoptThere are a number of objections to full-

ing such plans?

state assumption of public school costs.
6 An

Update of Education Reform in Michigan
Office of planning Coordination, October 197^, Technical
Report 1-12, p. 7.
,

?See California Assembly Bill No. 1406, May

5>

1971.

^See The Report of the New York State Commission
on the Quality, Cost and Financing of Elementary and Secon
dary Education , Vol. I, 1972.
.

9"state Funding Was Recommended by presidential
Commission,'' Wall St. Journal, March 7, 1972, p. 1.
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The primary argument against full-state
funding
Is the belief that the local school districts
will lose

control of the educational process by giving up
control
of the purse strings . 10
to support this argument,

Provinces)

Actually, there Is little evidence
The experience of states (or

that have fully assumed the costs of education

or nearly all the costs of education have indicated that

local control has not been hindered by the loss of local

control over the purse strings.

In Hawaii, which has a

centralized decision-making process, a uniform salary
schedule for teachers in the state and an equal per pupil

spending level, it has been found that the system
includes local administrative decision making .” 11

"

easily
In

Delaware and North Carolina, each allows strong, local

administrative control in conjunction with a highlycentralized state financing system which provides over
eighty per cent of the costs of education in each state.
In the Canadian province of New Brunswick, local control
has increased since the Province assumed the financial

responsibilities from the local districts.

The districts

now have control over curriculum matters which had been
10 Arthur Wise, "School Finance Equalization
Lawsuits: A Model Legislative Response,” Yale Review of
Law and Social Action Vol. II, No. 2, Winter 1971, p. 126.
,

11 John Coons, William Clune and Stephen Sugarman,
Private Wealth and Public Education (Cambridge, Mass:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 1^9.
,

^

U
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a prior function of the Province. 12

In Great Britain,

the Ministry of Education is a conduit for the money,
but the schools are fiercely Independent .

Breaking the tie between local financing and
local control can be accomplished without doing harm to
the exercise of true local control, and it may strengthen
it. 1 ^

Governor William Milllken of Michigan, in response

to a question about the possibility of loss of local con-

trol stated;
The answer is that school boards will continue
to do the same things they do now with one
exception -- they won't have to fight mlllage
battles for school district survival. 15
If a full-state funding plan were instituted, the state

would have to engage in collective bargaining with teachers
instead of the local districts.

A uniform salary schedule

for the state would be one consequences of full-state

assumption.
No one really knows whether any significant

erosion of local control would take place if full-state
l2 Arthur Wise, "School Finance Equalization,"
p.

127.
II, "Anatomy of a Revolution,"
20, 1971, p. 95.

^Harold Howe
Saturday Review

,

Nov.

^ James

Conant, "Full-State Funding," Financing
Public Schools (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
197^)7 Conference Series No. 71, p. H3.
Jan. 7
,

,

^william Milllken, "Quality Education,

the

Constitution and You," Michigan Associati on of School
Boards' Journal Jan., 1972, p. 19.
,

l^Ccnant

,

"Full-State Funding,"

p.

U^.
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funding were adopted in a large number of the states.
It is clear that the "loss of local control" argument
is

being used strongly by wealthy school districts.

They can

be expected to lose a certain amount of fiscal control,
and more importantly, their economic advantage over poorer

districts.

A statewide property tax, which is the most

likely replacement for the local property tax, will fall

more heavily on wealthy districts.

Rich districts now have

high- expenditure levels and low tax rates.

With a full-

state funding plan, school taxes would rise in wealthy

districts, and the level of spending would be frozen at
its present level.

^

The local control issue appears to

be as much a political smokescreen for rich districts as
a substantive issue.

It is very hard to talk about local control of

schools in isolation from state and federal governmental
actions.

The local school district is not an autonomous

body, but rather is part of an interdependent group of

governmental agencies.^®

Local control at the city level

is often not meaningful in relation to the educational

requirements of the students.

In urban areas, non-educational

costs are greater for other municipal services.

^ Report

This is

of the New York State Commission

,

p.

2.16.

ISsee Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas
(State of New York, l§7o). See also Serrano v., Priest
5 Cal 3d 584 (1971).

,
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known as municipal overburden, which is a
result of

a

high population concentration that requires more
and

costlier services and a high percentage of low-income
residents which requires additional costly human services. 19
Often, state aid for schools serves as a replacement fund
for local taxes, and this acts to transfer educational

funds to other areas in the budget.

For many school

districts, real local control or choice in the level of

spending for schools "is a cruel illusion under the existing

methods of school

f inance.

"

21

The second objection to full-state assumption of

educational costs is that it will eliminate the development
*-9"Michelson and Grubb have begun to undertake
this task by examining the interrelationship among many
variables Including school tax rates, non-education tax
rates, local school revenue per pupil, local revenue for
non-education purposes, property valuation, state school
aid, federal school aid, mean family Income, average
daily attendance, children from low-income families and
population.
Their work suggests many interesting interrelationships, causes and effects. One of their most
interesting conclusions is that non-educational spending
is, by and large, determined by factors beyond the control
of communities, and tends not to be subject to discretion.'
Educational spending, on the other hand, is more constrained
The school tax rate
by the availability of fiscal resources.
will be lowered if non-educational requirements are high
in burdened communities, while the non-education rate is not
similarly affected by a high school tax rate." Excerpt
from Paul Dimond," Serrano: A Victory of Sorts for Ethics,
Not Necessarily for Education," Yale Review of Law and Social
Action Vol. II, No. 2, Winter 1971, p. 140.
1

,

2Q Report of the New York State Commission
2J-Serrano v.

Priest, p. 620.

,

p.

2.43.
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of innovative programs in the high-expenditure

districts."

"

lighthouse

It is assumed that the high-expenditure

districts create educational Innovations and that these

innovations spread to the other districts.

Yet, there is

no reason why innovation should be accidental or based on

the wealth of the districts.

The states could encourage

innovation by providing grants to districts in the areas
where educational problems are the worst.

This would create

new "lighthouse districts" by design, rather than allowing
innovations to occur by chance or to be based on the wealth
of the district.

One such planned innovation was proposed

by the Fleischman Commission in New York State.

The "light-

house schools" would serve as the primary training institutions for all beginning teachers in the state. 22

Another argument used against full-state funding
of education is that the state's costs would be increased

greatly if per pupil spending were leveled up to the
highest spending district.

This, in fact, has been the

experience in New Brunswick, but the system could be designed to spread the increased costs over a number of years

instead of raising all districts to the top during the

first year. 23

The Fleischman Commission recommended that

22tfiHiam Stevens, "Fleischman Unit Said to Favor22
""
p.
Local School control. New York Times June 30, 1972,
,

23johns, et. al ., Alternative Programs fog
projec
Financing Education National Educational Finance
Yol. Vi 1971, p.~l25.
,

,
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the present level of spending In high-expenditure
dist-

ricts be frozen until all the other districts were
leveled
up to the highest level.

During the first year, all

districts below the sixty-fifth percentile of the state's

highest per pupil expenditure level would be raised to the

sixty-fifth percentile.

After the first year, school

districts would receive increments of fifteen per cent
per year until full equalization had taken place. 24

In

this manner, the high costs of leveling the poor districts
up to the top expenditure could be spread over a number
of years, and thus,

keep the initial Increase in state

expenditures for schools to a manageable level.

Arthur

Wise, working with a school finance commission in Maryland,

recommended a similar solution to the problem of increased
state costs as the one recommended by the Fleischman

Commission. 2 5
The controversial issues that surround full-state

assumption are more political than substantive.
to the tax-sheltered,

The threat

high-expenditure districts of the

suburbs lies at the heart of the local control issue.
It is also unclear whether a full-state assumption plan

would be supported by large cities.
2 4 Report of

Joel Burke's data

the New York State Commission

,

p.

"Inequities in the Benefits and
Burdens of Public Education," Financing Public Schools
Federal Reserve Bank, 1970) Conference Series
(Boston:
2 ^Arthur Wise,

,

,

No.

7,

p.

57.

2.44.
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suggests that it is unlikely unless a "municipal overburden factor" is included.
is very tough,

The politics of implementation

and this has been demonstrated by the lack

of legislative remedies for school financing inequities in

the past.

Only a court decision is likely to induce the

needed reforms in school finance in most states.

The states

will probably take a "wait and see" attitude until the
U.S. Supreme Court settles the constitutional question

surrounding the local property tax when it hears Rodriguez
v.

San Antonio sometime during the Winter 1972-73 session.

A negative decision would mean the end to a federal consti-

tutional attack on school finance inequities.

It would

force the movement for equity in school finance back to
the state courts, using the Robinson

v.

Cahill

2?

decision

as a precedent.

A victory for Rodriguez in the Supreme Court

would speed the reformulation

It is very likely that, given a

laws in most states.

victory for Rodriguez

of new school finance

,

most states would prefer to write

new school finance legislation without pressure of

court order.

a

Most have already set up school finance

commissions and are studying the issues in anticipation
of Serrano -type litigation.

26see Footnote 11.
27 R oblnson v. Cahill Superior Court of New
Jersey-Hudson County Docket No. L-18704-69 (1972).
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Recommended School Finance Plan
The plan outlined below has been constructed
to

equalize educational spending within states and within

school districts.

Tax burden equalization is also an

objective of the recommended plan.

Only action on the

part of the federal government could bring about equalization of spending inequalities between states.
1.

The state should assume the responsibility for

financing all public elementary and secondary
school costs (excluding federal aid).

The state

revenue would be raised through the use of a progressive income tax on personal income.

This would

equalize the tax burden by shifting it to the indi-

vidual's ability to pay and would remove the regressive features of the property tax. 2 ®
2.

The state will distribute the money to the school
The

districts on the basis of school registration.

allocation will be on the basis of estimated costs
for different types of education of students or on
a "weighted student"

basis.

The weightings would

author prefers the progressive income
a
tax as a source of revenue for education rather than
that
unlikely
statewide property tax, but it is very
revenue
the property tax will be given up as a source of
has
for an income tax. The Fleischman Commission
recommended a state property tax as did Arthur Wise s
study group in Maryland.
2 ®The

^
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have to be calculated according to each
state's needs,
but the National Educational Finance
Project's figures

serve as an example:

TABLE

1

STUDENT WEIGHTING INDEX 29
Educational Program

Weighting

Basic elementary grades 1-6
Grades 7-9
3. Grades 10-12
4. Physically handicapped
5. Compensatory education
6. Vocational education
!•
2.

1.00
1.20
l!40
3.25
2.00
1.80

In addition, weightings for retardation, disadvantaged

students and a municipal overburden factor would be calculated and added to the per pupil expenditure level received
by the districts.

The revenue allocated to the districts

would be distributed with the stipulation that each school
receive revenue according to its weighted pupil makeup.
This would allow for differences in spending between schools,
but rather on the basis of how much it costs to educate

the pupils inside.

The irrational intradistrict spending

patterns identified by Patricia Sexton in Detroit, Michigan,
and in the Hobson v. Hansen decision^ 0 in Washington, D.C.,

would no longer be allowed to exist.
2 9johns,

et al .

,

p.

269.

3°See Patricia Sexton, Education .and Income"
(New York: Viking Compass press, l§6l) and Hobson v
Hansen II 327 F. Supp. 844 (1971).
.

,
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3.

Regional education centers would be created by
the
state to help relieve the expenses of high-cost
educa-

tional services.

Vocational education, transportation,

psychological and other special services could be
provided by regional educational centers.
4.

Per-pupil expenditures would be leveled up to the
highest spending district in the state at the time
the plan was enacted.

The leveling-up process would

be carried out over a number of years to help spread

the increased spending of the state over a number of
years.

High- expenditure districts would be frozen

at their present levels until the rest of the districts

in the state were raised to their expenditure level.

The Fleischman Commission in New York recommended
that all districts below the sixty-fifth percentile
be brought up to that level the first year and raised

at a rate of fifteen per cent a year until the levelingup process reaches the top.

The spacing out of the

leveling-up process allows for a smooth transition
from the old finance system and allows the increased
expenses accrued by the state to be spread over a

period of years.
5.

Local school districts and school boards will retain
their present control over educational policies of
3l Report of the New York State Commission

,

p.

2.14.

.
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the school district.

Matters such as curriculum

decisions and personnel decisions will remain always
with the local district.

Collective bargaining will

become a statewide function rather than a local one,
and a state salary schedule for teachers will be

established
6.

The author hopes that the federal government would

move to erase the interstate disparities in school

spending through a revenue-sharing program or assumption of welfare costs.

If these proposals were adopted, an equitable

method for distributing school revenue and an equitable
method of financing schools would have been achieved.
CONCLUSIONS

Implications for Education
What will be the impact on education if the

wealth neutrality principle is upheld in Rodriguez
San Antonio in the U.S. Supreme Court?
clear.

v

.

One thing is

Most states will have to change their present

methods of financing schools.

The states, if placed

under a Serrano mandate, would have a variety of alter-

native school financing plans to choose from as described
in Chapter IV.

The courts have purposely avoided prescrlb

ing remedies for school finance inequities which are more
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appropriately the business of state legislatures.

Which

plan the states select is pure conjecture at this point
in time,

but the author has indicated his support for a

full-state funding plan.
It is also clear that by adopting a wealth

neutrality school financing system that money will be
redistributed.

Poor districts are likely to get Increased

revenues for education relative to the wealthy districts.

Whether the money will be spent on the education of poor
children is unclear.

Intradistrict disparities could

continue to exist unless the states moved to eliminate
the intradistrict disparities through the legislation
of the new school finance system.

It is not at all clear what kinds of educational

benefits will accrue to children in poor districts, if
any, because of the increased spending.

More highly-paid

teachers, new buildings, smaller classes and new curriculum

are unlikely to affect cognitive learning independent of

family background.

In all likelihood, the extra dollars

in poor districts will go to increased teacher salaries.

Daniel Moynihan observed:
The only certain result that will come from
this is that a particular cadre of middle-class-persons in the possession of certain licenses
that is to say, teachers -- will receive more
public money than they do now. 32
52 Daniel Moynihan, "Can the Courts and Money
Do It?," New York Times , Jan.. 10, 1972, p. E24.
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i’he

lllcely result will be that no changes In present

educational practices coming out of a favorable decision
in Rodriguez in the Supreme Court.

A victory for Rodriguez could have a long-

range impact on school finance and national finance that
no one has predicted.

The national tax structure could

change drastically if the Nixon Administration pushed

seriously for the adoption of a value-added tax to raise
revenue for education and other expenditures.

In January,

1972, President Nixon recommended that a value-added tax,
a form of a national sales tax,

be used to relieve the

pressure of the local property tax in financing education. 33
A value-added tax would increase the regressivity of the

national tax system rather than decrease it. 3^

Nixon

has since backed away from his position on the value-

added tax, but the ultimate impact of the wealth neutrality

principle may not be the one that was anticipated by
those who developed it.

Another long-range implication of

a

victory for

Rodriguez in the Supreme Court may be in the area of
low-cost housing.

It is possible, if the S errano principle

were adopted, that it would stop suburban communities

33Frank Fowlkes, "Administration Leans to ValueNational
Added Tax to Help Solve National Fiscal Crisis,"
Journal Feb. 5» 1972, pi 210.
,

3^Leonard Silk, "Value Added: Guess Who Finally
pays the Tax," New York Times Feb. 6, 1972, p. E3.
,
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from using the argument that the school districts
could
not afford to educate the children who live In low-cost
housing. 55

j)

0

argue that the cost of education for child-

ren from low-cost housing developments would no longer be
a legitimate or "respectable" argument.

The racial and

social objection of the suburbs to low-cost housing would

certainly persist, but it might make it more difficult to
fight low-income housing on purely economic grounds.

Another potential long-range implication of the
Serrano principle is in the area of other municipal services.
The California Supreme Court argued that the wealth neutrality principle was not applicable to fire protection,

police protection and other municipal services. 56
The issue of the applicability of wealth neutrality to

other governmental services will be tested in the courts.
In June, 1972, two suits were filed contending that the
S

errano principle could be applied to police and fire

protection in Marin County and in Los Angeles County. 57
The courts will have to decide if the wealth neutrality

principle is applicable to other municipal services.

Action

,

35lntroduction, Yale Review of Law and Social
Vol. II, No. 2, Winter 19?1, p. 1^9.
56 serrano v » Priest

,

pp. 622-23.

37 jhe .educational Commission of the States
Legislative Review^ Vol. II , No . 14, July 10, 1972 p.
,

2.
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Possible changes In the national tax structure

may result from the acceptance of the wealth neutrality
principle.

The wealth neutrality principle negates

economic arguments against low-income housing, which Is

synonomous with Integration In urban areas.

The acceptance

of the S errano principle is not likely to speed racial

integration, but it will demonstrate more conclusively that
It is racism, not increased school costs, which makes

suburban communities fight low-income housing.
If the Supreme Court overturns the wealth

neutrality principle, then the battle

gain equity In

to

school finance will be moved to the state constitutional
level as in the Robinson
event,

v.

Cahill decision.

In either

education is not likely to change much concerning

its impact on children, whether the Serrano principle

wins or loses in the courts.
A

comment that Francis Keppel, a former U.S.

Commissioner of Education, made at

a recent school finance

conference at Harvard University sums up this author's

feelings about the potential impact of the
education

—

S

errano for

victorious or not in the Supreme Court.

It looks to me as if educators had better not
assume that actions of legislatures or courts
are going to deal with the fundamental issue,
which is the guestion of equity in the handling
of children. 3o

38p r ancis Keppel, "The Continuing Responsibility
(Boston: Federal
of Education," Financing Public Schools
±9(d, P*
5
Reserve Bank), Conference Series No. 7, Jan.,
,
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Equity In the distribution of school revenue
Is an
essential flrBt step toward the attainment of
Improved

educational quality for poor and minority students,
but
It Is only a beginning.
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NATIONWIDE MEDIAN TEST SCORES FOR
1ST AND 12TH-GRADE PUPILS, FALL 1965

Racial or Ethic Group

Puerto
Ricans

Indian
Americans

Mexican OrientAmerial
cans
Americans

Negro Majority

1st grade:

Nonverbal
Verbal
12th grade:
Nonverbal
Verbal
Reading
Mathematics
General Information
Average of the 5 tests

Source:

45.8
44.9

53.0
47.8

50.1
46.5

56.6
51.6

43.4
45.4

54.1
59.2

43.3
43.1
42.6
43.7
41.7
43.1

47.1
43.7
44.3
45.9
44.7
45.1

45.0
43.8
44.2
45.5
43.3
44.4

51.6
49.6
48.8
51.3
49.0
50.1

40.9
40.9
42.2
41.8
40.6
41.1

52.0
52.1
51.9
51.8
52.3
52.0

Coleman Report, Equal Educational Opportunity, 1966, p. 20
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B*'

"Scribner Asks for Improved Instruction in Reading,"
New York: Times Peb. 20, 1972, p. 55* The data was
released by Chancellor Scribner on Feb. 19, 1972, and
the report compared this city's reading averages against
the national average.
The chart shows, by grade, how
far the city's pupils were behind the national
average.
,

Grade
Grade
Grade
Grade
Grade
Grade
Grade
Grade

2-2
3-6
4-9
5-9
6-9
7-1
8-1
9-1

months
months
months
months
months
year, 8 months
year, 6 months
year, 4 months

M

3

E
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April 14, 1972

The Friends

To:

of the School Finance

Reform Movemr^
From:

R. Stephen Browning

Subject:

Status Report on School Finance

RODR]gUEZ

V.

Reform

SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

^^On Monday,

April 17, the State of Texas will file its jurisdictional
statement in the Su^r^me~Court for its appeal of the Rodriguez decision.
The plaintiffs will have thirty days to respond to the state's pleading, and
then the court will decide whether it shall hear the case or dispose of it
summarily. If it decides to hear the case, it will not do so until sometime
after the beginning of the October 1972 term.

you may be considering participating as amicus curiae in
the Rodriguez appeal. If that is the case, I would very much appreciate
it if you would respond to me on the following three questions:

Some

of

plan on preparing and filing an amicus
curiae brief?

a)

Do you

b)

Would you be interested

amicus
Committee
curiae brief prepared by Lawyers’
in signing an

volunteers ?
c)

willing to help us defray part of
the printing costs for one or more amicus curiae

Would you be
briefs?

2
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DIRECTORY OF ORGANIZATIONS
One month ago the Lawyers' Committee, in conjunction with two
other organizations, compiled 500 copies of a 50 page directory of
organizations interested in school finance reform. The directory, which

we planned

to send to everyone on our school finance mailing list, gave
a thumbnail sketch on the various organizations, with a description of
their school finance programs, a listing of their resources, and the names,
addresses, and phone numbers of their contact people. Unfortunately, we
grossly underestimated the demand for the directory. So, if you do not
receive a copy with this letter, please let me know whether you would like
one, and if we prepare another edition, I will send you a copy.

NEW PUBLICATIONS ON SCHOOL FINANCE
The past few months has seen the publication of several significant
documents pertaining to school finance reform. The first was the long
awaited publication of the findings and recommendations of the President's
Commission on School Finance. Responsibility for the dissemination of
the final report of the President’s Commission (147 pages long) and the 20
or so back up appendices has been given to the U. S. Office of Education.
For information on the availability of these reports, I suggest that you
contact Mr. Charles B. Saunders, Jr. Deputy Commissioner for External
,

Relations, U. S. Office of Education,
D. C. 20202.

Room

4143,

FOB

6,

Washington,

you who are interested in the education of Mexican
American children in the southwest, I commend to you a four volume
study recently published by the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights. The
fourth volume of the study, which deals primarily with school finance
problems in the Southwest, will be released sometime early this summer.
Copies of these reports can be obtained by writing the U. S. Commission
on Civil Rights, Washington, D. C. 20425.

For those

of

J

THE STATUS OF LITIGATION
Since our January newsletter was published, th e list of school
pending
finance cases has^ nearly doubled. Ther e are now at least 45 suits
case_to the
in at least 27 states. Although the app eal of the Rodriguez_
of
"Supreme Court may have slackenedThe pace of prosecut ion of so me
the
improve
To help
fhese* suitsy many of thenrareadvancing rapid ly.
planning a second
currently
quaHty~of the prosecution of thes^lufs'we'are
somewhere
school finance litigation conference to be held in mid-summer
with more details
in the mid-west. In a month or so I will be back in touch

3
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for those of you

who are

actively involved in litigation.

LEGISLATION

A number

of states

have already began to respond

to the

Serrano

The most common response has been to appoint school
finance commissions. However, in some legislatures bills have already
been introduced which comport with the ’’fiscal neutrality” principle. To
line of cases.

get a better idea of what is going on nationally in the various state legislatures on the school finance question, I suggest that you contact Dr. Russell
B. Vlaanderen at the Education Commission of the States and ask to be put,
on ECS’s mailing list for its weekly publication, "Legislative Review”
(300 Lincoln Tower, 1860 Lincoln Street, Denver, Colorado 80203).

One of the more promising legislative activities on the school finance——'
scene was the establishment of ’’T he Sp ecial Committee on School Finance”
recently announced by the National Le glsl atTveT C onf e rence^ This Committee
is preparing a set ofre comm e nd at ions whichwi 11 be presented to the full
National Legislative Conference at its annual meeting in early August of
this year. Hopefully, out of this will result a practical set of materials
explaining the constitutional alternatives available for financing public
schools. I will be back in touch with you as soon as we learn more about
the development and availability of these legislative materials.

STATISTICAL INFORMATION
have enclosed with this letter two statistical tables which I trust
you will find most informative. The first is a comprehensive, yet concise,
compilation of school finance data prepared by ECS. The second item,
prepared by the staff of the President’s Commission on School Finance,
lists the additional dollar amounts it would cost in each state to level up
to the 50th, 60th, 70th, 80th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of current perI

pupil expenditures.

:jc

Enclosures:
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COST OF EQUALIZING EXPENDITURES TO VARIOUS
PUPIL' PERCENTILE LEVELS, BY STATE

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia

95th per- 90th per- 80th per- 70th per- 60th per- 50th percentile
centile
centile
centile
centile
centile
(millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millionTY (mllllonsT
50.5
$
40.2
$
22.2
$
17.5
$
12.6
$
5.4
$
10.2
10.2
9.1
4.0
0.2
0.2
89.9
79.6
55.5
37.3
13.8
10.3
49.0
37.1
19.5
15.5
12.3
7.3
1382.2
731.2
392.0
216.4
174.0
141.7
65.0
65.0
65.0
43.6
16.9
14.6
179.6
126.8
83.5
62.1
35.3
22.9
32.3
32.3
7.7
5.7
3.0
1.6
-

185.1
188.9
10.5
56.9
680.6
161.9
112.0
101.7
109.6
66.4
23.1
175.2
344.6
473.1
107.2
56.5
143.0
337.0
79.0
15.7
20.3
372.2
33.1
998.9
84.9
24.1
530.8
111.2
70.4
456.8
45.3
28.2
30.8
88.9
394.7
33.5
26.9
140.3

-

117.2
162.6
8.7
33.6
401.6
112.9
85.4
69.6
57.1
53.6
23.1
175.2
236.0
326.6
107.2
40.6
107.1
62.5
48.3
8.1
16.9
285.6
25.3
537.7
84.9
17.7
471.8
55.4
54.6
456.8
45.3
28.2
20.1
88.9
263.4
13.1
21.4
130.8

-

117.2
57.9
2.9
14.4
294.4
76.9
42.1
26.6
57.1
27.8
16.7
28.1
121.9
186.5
76.0
35.0
105.8
34.8
19.2
1.3
11.1
164.5
14.4
275.8
42.5
14.4
256.9
36.0
31.8
351.7
18.1
19.4
10.8
64.4
144.1
9.4
13.7
130.8

_

83.5
25.5
2.9
14.4
294.4
71.3
30.9
16.9
31.9
17.6
10.3
28.1
68.4
125.5
57.4
21.5
61.6
19.6
11.5
1.3
7.5
106.5
5.2
275.8
36.0
8.2
182.7
23.5
17.7
180.3
13.9
14.5
5.7
54.0
92.5
7.0
11.9
68.8

45.2
23.5
2.9
9.6
194.1
47.9
24.8
11.8
14.6
12.1
7.3
24.2
51.1
109.9
33.6
16.1
46.2
17.2
10.5
0.0
3.6
69.6
2.9
275.8
28.7
5.5
136.8
13.4
13.8
113.9
8.1
6.7
2.6
33.7
55.7
1.7

35.8
16.0
2.4
5.1

96.8
33.0
12.6
11.8
9.8
11.3
5.2
14.3
42.4
87.3
22.5
10.8
28.7
9.5
7.7
0.0
2.3
42.4
0.9
244.5
19.5
4.9
79.5
13.2
13.8
62.7
5

•

3

8.2

6.4
2.6
14.9
40.9
1.4
4.8

43.3

21.7

(continued)
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(continued)

Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Totals

95th per- 90th per- 80th per- 70th per- 60th per- 50th percentile
centilc
centile
centile
centile
centile
(millions) (millions) (milliono) (millions) (millions) millions)
107.2
107.2
79.3
55.9
43.3
28.0
31.4
30.8
16.8
12.3
11.3
4.9
13.4
9.0
5.8
3.5
2.1
2.1
38.8
27.1
16.1
8.5
4.0
1.3

$8758.8
million

$6151.4

million

$3724.9
million

$2588.5
million

$1855.4

million

$1285.0
million

'
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March 6, 1972

R. Stephen Browning, Esq.

Staff Attorney
Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights under Law
Suite 520
733 Fifteenth Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20005
Re:
vs.

Joseph F. Timilty, et al
Francis W. Sargent, Governor of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al
United States District Court

Dear Mr. Browning:
Please excuse this less than prompt response to your
letter of February 8, 1972. I thank you for forwarding
to me the Lawyers' Committee school finance litigation
packet, which has proved to be most helpful to me in ray
preparation of a memorandum in support of a motion for
summary judgment. I have enclosed herewith for your
information a copy of the Defendants' Answer in the
above- captioned action.

With respect to the critical issue you raised in your
letter respecting the questionable benefit to the City of
Boston resulting from the filing and prosecution of the
suit, I can only respond by stating that I am very much
aware of possible adverse effects that could be visited
upon the City of Boston if our challenge of the present
scheme for funding public education is successful. As you
will note from the declaration in this action, we are not

.
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Brown

&.

Proctor

R. Stephen Browning, Esq,
Staff Attorney-

Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law
Page 2
March 6, 1972
1

seeking injunctive relief but merely hope to precipitate
a legislative response guided by the standard of "fiscal
neutrality" so aptly set forth in the Serrano decision
and its prodigy,
I hope that the filing of a motion for summary judgment
will stimulate the Massachusetts Legislature which to this
date has done little or nothing substantive by way of
investigation of alternative methods for funding public
education. There had been filed with the Legislature last
year a report of a special commission respecting taxation
in the Commonwealth. The implementation of the recommendations contained in that report, and the possible alternative
for funding public education, should fit together very well.

In sum, I thank you for your offer to assist us in a
clearing house capacity and would very much appreciate any
and all information you could forward to us. In fact, we
may seek your more active assistance in that myself and Mr.
Paul W. Goodrich are proceeding pro bono and at the largess
of our respective firms, the net effect" of which is to force
us to do a considerable amount of the necessary work at odd
. hours

JJM: ss

Enclosure
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'E'

INTRASTATE DISPARITIES IN PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES
1969-70

High

Alabama
Alaska Revenue/pupils
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
it^ihsas

Kentucky
Louisiana
M*i,ne

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana average of groups
Nebraska average of groups
Njsyhda

Ne^ Hampshire
Jersey 1968-69
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota county averages
Ohio
Oklahoma
Neifr

OJrOgon

Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont

Low

index

581
1,810
2,223
664
2,414
2,801
1,311
1,081

$344
480
436
434
569
444
499
633

1.7
3.8
5.1
1.9
4.2
6.3
2.6
1.7

1,036
736

593
365

1.7
2.0

1,763
2,295
965
1,167
1,831

474
391
447
592
454
358
499
229
635
515
491
370
283
213
539
623
746
311
400
477
669
467
686
413
342
399
484
531
397
350
315
264
533
357

3.7
5.9
2.1
2.0
4.0
2.5
1.8
6.8
1.6
2.5
2.8
2.4
3.0
8.0
3.2
1.9
2.3
3.8
3.7
2.5
2.8
1.4
2.3
4.0
7.5
3.5
2.9
2.3
1.5
5.0
2.4
20.2
2.3
4.2

885
892

1,555
1,037
1,281
1,364
903
825

1,699
1,716
1,175
1,679
1,191
1,485
1,183
1,889
733
1,623
1,685
2,566
1,432
1,401
1,206
610
1,741
700
5,334
1,515
1,517

(continued)
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(continued)

High

Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

1 ,126

3,406
722
1,432
14,554

Low

High/low
index

441
434
502
344
618

2.6
7.8
1.4
4.2
23.6

NOTES
For New Jersey data are for fiscal year 1969 since fiscal
year 1970 data were not yet available.

For Alaska data represent revenue per pupil.
For Montana and Nebraska data are high and low of average
for districts grouped by size.
For North Dakota data are averages of expenditures of all
districts within a county.

Data are not fully comparable between States since they
are based entirely on what data the individual State included
in their expenditures-per-pupil analysis.
Source:

State Reports and Verbal contacts with State Officials.
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COMPUTATION OF PROGRESSIVITY VALUES (T VALUES)
OF ALL TAXES FEDERAL STATE AND LOCAL, 1968
(EXCLUDING SOCIAL SECURITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT TAXES)

—

,

AMOUNT
(in millions)

TAX

TOTAL FEDERAL TAXES:*
1.
Individual income
2.
Corporate income
3.
Estate and gift
4.
Sales, excises & other

TOTAL

PROGRESSIVITY
VALUE
(T Value)

78,155
29,897
3,015
14,387

50
24
50
16

125,454

TOTAL STATE TAXES:*
1
Individual and
corporate income
2.
Sales, gross receipts
3.
Property
4.
Estate and gift
5.
All other

39.90++

.

TOTAL
LOCAL SCHOOL TAXES:**
Property
1.
All other
2.

TOTAL

8,749
20,979
912
872
4,888

35
15
14
50

36,400

20. 49++

14,157

14
14

14

289

14.00+

14,446

*Statistical Abstract of the United States

State Government Finances

,

1969,

in 1968, U. S. Dept, of

Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
**N.E.A. Estimates of School Statistics, 1968-69

Weighted

average.
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'G'

CLASSIFICATION OF THE STATES INTO TYPES
SCHOOL SUPPORT PLANS USED FOR THE SCHOOL YEAR, 1968-69*
Equalization Programs

Flat Grant
Programs

Arizona
Arkansas
Connecticut
Delaware
New Mexico
North Carolina
South Carolina

StrayerHaig

Alabama
Alaska
California
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wyoming

Percentage
Equalizing
Iowa
Massachusetts
New York
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Vermont

Guaranteed
Valuation
or Tax
Yield Plan
Utah
Wisconsin

the principal
These classifications deal only witheach
state.

appropriation for the public schools in

Complete
State
and
Federal
Support
Hawaii

state
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